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NOTE:

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE IMPACT OF THE DIRECT ELECTION OF SENATORS  
ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO  
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

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## PREFACE

Alexander Bickel, in writing of Populism, made the assertion that over time Populism begets a "dialectic of illusion and disillusion."<sup>1</sup> One could justifiably also make the same assertion regarding democratic reform, i. e., that democratic reform over time also begets a dialectic of illusion and disillusion. The illusions of democratic reform, for example, were articulated early by the Progressive reformers. Their exhortations on reform were totally positive in nature and completely optimistic as far as their belief in what reform could accomplish. Woodrow Wilson, in considering these Progressive measures stated in all confidence that:

No man who understands the principles upon which this Republic was founded has the slightest dread of the gentle, -- though very effective, -- measures by which the people are again resuming control of their affairs.<sup>2</sup>

And this illusion has persisted down to our present day in the minds of many Americans. There seems, in fact, to be an underlying compulsiveness on the part of many to look to democratization as a remedy

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<sup>1</sup>Alexander M. Bickel, The Age of Political Reform (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1914), p. 245.

for all serious institutional and structural problems within the polity.

When there is no other cure for political ills, democratic reform is often called upon to remedy the situation. Commenting on this peculiarly American fetish and its implications for electoral reform, Irving Kristol and Paul Weaver suggested:

This obsession [one man, one vote] -- it can hardly be called anything else--testifies to the extent to which, in recent decades, the democratic idea has been vulgarized and trivialized. From being a complex idea, implying a complex mode of government appropriate to a large and complex society, the idea of democracy has been debased into a simple-minded, arithmetical majoritarianism--government by adding machine.<sup>1</sup>

But there is also an important antithetical belief in democratic reform which strikes a more somber tone among students of democracy and which exhibits a greater respect for the limitations of reform. It suggests, in fact, that caution should be exhibited whenever an institution is in need of reform and that one should not expect miracle solutions from democratization. William Allen White, who typified this belief, contended in talking of the prospects of reform that:

When we find that the millennium did not dawn after crass bribery had been abolished by the introduction of the secret ballot, we must not assume that a number of men of wealth conspired deliberately to postpone the sunrise. We all conspired; we were not ready for the sunrise.<sup>2</sup>

It is the purpose of this study to try and penetrate this illusion of democratic reform by asserting that on the basis of systematic research it

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<sup>1</sup>Irving Kristol and Paul Weaver, "A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come," New York Times Magazine, November 23, 1969, pp. 154, 156.

<sup>2</sup>William Allen White, The Old Order Changeth (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1912), p. 37.

is more beneficial for the researcher to view reform with a similar skeptical attitude of disillusionment proposed by White rather than to err in the opposite direction. To make such an assertion I have chosen to focus my attentions on one such reform--the Seventeenth Amendment--viewing the impact that this Amendment had on both the Senate as a political institution as well as the political system as a whole. Since the Amendment's passage had been hailed as an epoch-making democratic reform<sup>1</sup> and since it had had a past history of nearly 90 years of attempted passage prior to ratification, this seemed to be a logical focal point to test this assertion.

As for the Amendment itself it was essentially the total product of those who believed in the illusion of reform. It was proclaimed law during the same period of time that the direct primary, referendum, and recall were implanted on the political system. It was in essence a product of a period that might be referred to as the "golden age" of democratic reform. The primary purpose for the Seventeenth Amendment was essentially to counter what had been termed by reformers as the aristocratic nature of the Senate by popularizing the election of senators. Prior to 1913 the election of senators had been conducted exclusively by state legislatures and regulated by the individual states according to Article I, Section 3, Paragraph 2 of the U. S. Constitution. Senators from some of the states were selected by the two state houses when in separate sessions, while in seventeen states the two houses

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<sup>1</sup>George H. Haynes, "The Senate: New Style," The Atlantic Monthly, CXXXIV (August, 1924), 252.

held joint meetings.<sup>1</sup> Before 1866 election in most states was determined on the basis of a majority vote in both houses, while in a few, a plurality decision was considered sufficient to elect. After 1866 a law was passed by Congress and approved July 25, 1866 regulating the method of choice in all states. According to this law, the first vote for a senator was to be made viva voce by each state house sitting separately with its choice determined by majority selection. The two houses would then hold a joint meeting and either ratify their decisions or, if no candidate had received a majority vote, participants in the joint meeting would make another selection by majority vote. The joint assembly was instructed to continue meeting until a decision was reached.<sup>2</sup>

It was this method Progressives felt should be changed and democratized, putting the power of decision in the hands of the voter. And so in 1913 after a long campaign for reform, the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified and each state was required to follow the procedure as outlined in the Amendment below--the same procedure of election followed today:

#### ARTICLE XVII

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite

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<sup>1</sup>36 Cong. Globe 1571 (1866) (remarks of Senator Reverdy Johnson).

<sup>2</sup>14 Stat. 243-44 (1866).

for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies;

Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies of election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

The primary means for examining the impact of this Amendment on the political system was to study carefully the institutional operations of the Senate, noting any possible changes in these operations resulting from reform. As Bickel suggested, this seemed to be the soundest means to gain this insight into institutional reform:

Their actual operation must be assessed, often in sheer wonder, before they are tinkered with, lest great expectations be not only defeated, but mocked by the achievement of their very antithesis.<sup>1</sup>

But it was only after the researcher separated the "great expectations" of the Progressive reformers from the "mocking antitheses" of the unexpected results of the Seventeenth Amendment that he was able to perceive for the first time the veritable failure of reform to bring about the prophesied millennium.

Now the study is complete, I must pause to thank a number of people who assisted me in the preparation of this manuscript. Most

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<sup>1</sup>Bickel, The New Age of Political Reform, p. 3.

particularly, of course, I would like to thank Theodore J. Lowi who served as my chairman and offered the original inspiration for this study. He was also responsible for encouraging me to broaden my theoretical outlook and refine my approach in looking at popular election. Duncan MacRae, Jr., also deserves acknowledgment for providing me with the statistical sophistication that is revealed in this study. In addition, he also deserves credit for giving my rough draft a most thorough reading. J. David Greenstone offered me further insights through a series of very penetrating questions he asked based on the final draft which aided me in shoring up the work and further refining the product. John D. May, who first served on my committee, was also very helpful in giving me important guidelines in the preparation of the final revision. And to my wife, Kathryn, I should like to extend my thanks for her insightful editing ability, her typing expertise and, most importantly, for her desire to be a willing assistant in this project whenever she was called upon.

The conclusion and assertions made in the text, of course, are mine and any errors in judgment can only be my responsibility.



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## CHAPTER I

### DIRECT ELECTION: A DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE TO INSTITUTIONAL "OLIGARCHY"

The American tradition is to destroy institutions patently oligarchical or to transmute their reality into conformity with democratic forms.<sup>1</sup>

"The American tradition" is so intermixed with the values, norms, and traditions of democracy<sup>2</sup> that the two are almost inseparable. Thus when speaking of one, we must also speak of the other. One undeniable aspect of this tradition is its principal concern for the equality of man and egalitarian values in general.<sup>3</sup> Harold Laski

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<sup>1</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 131.

<sup>2</sup>The definition of "democracy" which I shall use denotes a political system wherein there is an opportunity for the citizens of a state to "participate freely in . . . the political decisions which affect their individual and collective lives."

Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, ed., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1964), p. 187.

<sup>3</sup>Lipset suggested that this stress on equality can be seen whenever we interact one with another. We can see it in the increased use of flattery with one another, in the use of first names among those who hardly know one another, and in the interest among most citizens to avoid hurting one another's feelings.

Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963), p. 318.



suggested that this regard for the equality of all citizens serves as the basis of most democracies and results in a system of political power being "erected upon the similarities and not the differences between men."<sup>1</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville noticed this devotion to equality was particularly fervent in the U. S. :

But for the equality their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery. They will endure poverty, servitude, barbarism, but they will not endure aristocracy.<sup>2</sup>

Other foreign visitors wrote accounts of their impressions of our polity which generally agreed with this assessment. One British writer of the 1860's, for example, was especially impressed on a visit to the U.S. by the "aggressive egalitarianism of the people."<sup>3</sup> Of course some social distinctions and inequalities are always a matter to be reckoned with, even in the purest democratic state. Yet, even so, observers like David M. Potter maintained that in the U. S. :

Social rank can seldom assert an open claim to deference in this country, and it usually makes at least a pretense to egalitarian ways.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Harold J. Laski, "Equality and Democracy" quoted in Hillman M. Bishop and Samuel Hendel, Basic Issues of American Democracy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 10.

<sup>2</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, ed. by Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), 103.

<sup>3</sup>Max Berger, The British Traveller in America, 1836-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 54-55.

<sup>4</sup>David M. Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 96.

Egalitarian Influence on Institutions

Most social and political institutions<sup>1</sup> structured within a democracy cannot help but be deeply affected and shaped by these values and norms. Religious institutions in the U. S., for instance, reflect the influence of this democratic environment. Tocqueville again observed that democratic values had been so infused within our religious institutions that Christianity as practiced in the U. S. appeared as a "democratic and republican religion."<sup>2</sup> Seymour M. Lipset also suggested much the same thing when he wrote that:

Democracy has divorced religion from political power, and made the organization of its Protestant sects democratic. It is antagonistic to the self-righteous concepts of "the elect" in Calvinism. As such, democracy has made religious institutions an appropriate place to satisfy the individual's ambition to succeed.<sup>3</sup>

And democracy has had an equally strong effect upon our educational institutions. Strict adherence to the equal treatment of students has almost blinded educational administrators at all levels of education to the many intellectual differences evident among students and has

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<sup>1</sup>A social institution may be defined as "regulative principles which organize the activities of individuals within society into definite organizational patterns from the point of view of some of the perennial, basic problems of any society or ordered social life."

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Social Institutions," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XIV, 409.

A political institution may be defined as organized and established values, norms, and actions shaped by the functions of the State that regulate political action into orderly patterns.

<sup>2</sup>Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 311.

<sup>3</sup>Lipset, The First New Nation, p. 204.

prevented students from enjoying educational programs suited to these differences.<sup>1</sup> In addition, democratic values have also served as a guiding force in the labor movement.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, there is little concern for class consciousness in the ideology of the labor movement in the U.S. --a fact that Lipset traced to the "equalitarian anti-class orientation of the values associated with America's national identity."<sup>3</sup>

#### Egalitarian Influence on Political Institutions

Although most all institutions within a democracy are generally affected by these values, there are always a few which momentarily escape total "democratization."<sup>4</sup> But these institutions are soon either rejected or modified beyond recognition. In the 1820's, for example, the election process for selecting presidential electors was thought "anti-democratic" since the power of selection rested with the state legislatures rather than the popular electorate. This method of election was soon replaced when a majority of the states made strong demands for popular control.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, during this same decade

<sup>1</sup>This is particularly true regarding the opportunities provided for the gifted child in secondary education. Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>4</sup>"Democratization" is the process which allows citizens of a particular polity to freely participate in political decisions which affect their individual and collective lives. When an institution is "democratized," institutional decisions are either opened up to participation by citizens, or decisions are made by representatives who have been freely chosen by these citizens.

<sup>5</sup>William G. Carleton, "The Collapse of the Caucus," Current History, XXV (September, 1953), 144.

politicians and voters alike began to bitterly complain that presidential nominations were totally controlled by Congress, giving the people no power to regulate these important decisions.<sup>1</sup> And so Congress was relieved of the privilege of selecting the president through congressional caucus and, instead, the people were given this prerogative through the convention system.<sup>2</sup>

Democratic pressures also altered the appearance of party institutions. Since the 1840's party leaders have been forced to make certain alterations in procedure, such as accepting direct primaries as a part of the nominating procedure, in order to sell the party to the voters as an egalitarian institution. Where institutional alterations were not evident, every effort was made to improve the appearance of the party, giving it a more egalitarian "image." The Whigs, for example, found it necessary to completely divest themselves of any pretense to a "caste" superiority and were forced to remake themselves into a "party of the people." As Dixon Fox related:

A fierce rivalry in simplicity sprang up between the parties. Charles Ogle, of Pennsylvania, made a speech in Congress arraigning President Van Buren as a sybarite, who drank Madeira wine, and had made a palace of the people's White House by his enormous expenditures for decoration. This speech, spread throughout the country, was the Whig's most effective tract.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Dixon R. Fox, The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1919), pp. 411-13.

And campaign rhetoric and appeal has changed little over the years in party confrontations within the polity.<sup>1</sup>

#### Democratizing the Senate

It was thus only natural that the Senate--long criticized for being a legislature of "aristocrats"<sup>2</sup>--should be one of those institutions selected by the reformers for modification and democratization. Many voters during these years felt that the Senate was unable to properly represent them because senators were not dependent on them for their seats. One observer argued:

There is a belief in the public mind that proper deference is not given by the Senate of the United States to the demands and interests of the people, and that this is largely due to the fact that Senators do not owe their positions to the people, who are permanent, but to the legislatures which are transient.<sup>3</sup>

And the resolution for this "anti-democratic" deviation was to find a means whereby the masses could gain direct control of the legislative process--a solution commonly arrived at during the Progressive

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<sup>1</sup>Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie in the 1968 campaign for the presidency, for example, attempted to suggest that Nixon and Agnew symbolized slick, well-oiled politicians, while they typified the simple life of a democratic polity.

Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970), pp. 141, 161.

<sup>2</sup>See David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The U.S. Senate, 1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 250.

<sup>3</sup>John H. Mitchell, "Election of Senators by Popular Vote," The Forum, XXI (March-August, 1896), 395.

age.<sup>1</sup> In the words of James M. Burns: "The battle cry of political progressivism was 'direct democracy' and its motto, 'the only cure for democracy is more democracy!'"<sup>2</sup> Popular opinion of the time felt that the most efficient way for the people to gain claim to the Senate would be through a change in the election process, allowing senators to be selected by popular constituencies rather than by state legislatures. And there were enough supporters of this opinion to wage a long and successful campaign for reform that eventually culminated in the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1913.

#### The Long Campaign for Reform

Positive attempts to democratize senatorial elections had been made many years before the ratification of the Amendment in 1913. Nothing, however, came of the first such plan for change in 1826 when Congressman Henry R. Storrs (R-N. Y.) introduced a resolution before the House of Representatives to democratize senatorial elections. Nor did any concrete results materialize from reform attempts in 1835

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<sup>1</sup>Harold U. Faulkner suggested that democratic reforms of this sort around the turn of the century came frequently:

"The years from 1898 to 1914 were years of almost ceaseless constitutional tinkering. And the one constant thought in the minds of the members of the conventions was to curb the powers of the legislatures."

Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice, 1898-1914 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1931), p. 84.

<sup>2</sup>James M. Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 83.

and 1850.<sup>1</sup> Five resolutions for change were introduced in the 1850's but were thereafter killed on the Senate floor. Until 1872, in fact, only nine resolutions made any significant headway; but in the years following, the number of bills and resolutions introduced was staggering and their successes in the House were frequent. A session never passed without some form of the resolution coming before Congress. In the first session of the Fifty-second Congress, for instance, some twenty-five resolutions were offered, while in the Fifty-third, Fifty-fifth, and Fifty-sixth Congresses, the Amendment successfully passed the House each time only to be defeated in the Senate.<sup>2</sup> Between 1893 and 1911 the pattern was much the same. The House of Representatives proposed and approved a popular election amendment in each session of Congress during these years, but each time it failed to win Senate approval. In a polity undergoing constant democratic revision, few institutions based on an exclusion of the mass voter could long survive. The Senate up to 1911 had been able to successfully thwart the constant pressures for modification and revision because the rules of democratization required the Senate's assent to its own democratization. Naturally, supporters of the Amendment found it all but impossible to upset established power bases both within the Senate and within the state legislative constituencies until the mass voters themselves began to

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<sup>1</sup>J. W. Perrin, "Popular Election of United States Senators," The North American Review, CXCII (December, 1910), 799-804.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

exert increased influence within the system by forcing the hands of state legislators to elect senators independent from these established power bases.<sup>1</sup> This time came only after the defeat in 1910 of ten Republicans who had opposed the Amendment in previous Congresses. It was in the Sixty-second Congress after ten new non-Southern Democrats lent support to the senators in favor of the Amendment that the Senate as a body passed the popular election resolution.<sup>2</sup>

The campaign for adoption of this Amendment affected all levels of government and many of the major political institutions. Political parties, for example, first took an active interest in the campaign when members of the People's Party of 1892, the Socialist Labor Party of 1896, and the Democratic Party of 1900 wrote their demands in support of direct election into their party platforms.<sup>3</sup> The two major parties also became actively involved in the Amendment controversy within the Senate. Democrats--particularly those in the South--were decidedly more favorable to the idea of direct election than Republicans. Southern

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<sup>1</sup>The "independent" election of senators, while never formalized until 1913, began to occur informally in a number of states at the turn of the century when the direct primary and the public canvass of the mass voter took on greater importance in Senate selection. These two instruments of election tended to strengthen the position of the mass voter at the expense of the state legislatures, turning their function of election into one of ratifying a decision that had, for all intents and purposes, already been made by the voter.

<sup>2</sup>U. S. Congress, Congressional Directory, 62nd Cong., 1st sess., 1911, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup>George Haynes, The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1906), p. 105.



Democrats were more eager to support the Amendment than others because they had already found aspects of direct democracy, such as the direct primary, beneficial to them.<sup>1</sup> Republicans from the Eastern states, on the other hand, were the most articulate spokesmen against the Amendment. Certain Republican senators, no doubt, opposed the Amendment fearing they would lose control of their state political organizations, while conservatives such as Senator Chauncey DePew (R-N. Y.) felt that all change affecting the Constitution should be forbidden.<sup>2</sup> Still other Republicans were in agreement with former Senator Theodore E. Burton (R-Ohio), who considered that the strains of two elections--a primary and a final election--were not worth the effort to win election:

Then there is the matter of the direct primary, with which I have had no experience. The thought of making a strenuous and statewide campaign to secure nomination, followed by another equally severe and extensive effort for election, is distasteful to me. . . . I am quite decided in the opinion that I shall withdraw from public life.<sup>3</sup>

Western Republicans, however, took issue with their Eastern colleagues and generally supported the views of such outspoken maverick leaders

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<sup>1</sup>Southern Democrats found the direct primary and the city manager plan to be successful means for candidates to directly confront the electorate and at the same time avoid the political machines.

C. Van Woodward, The Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), p. 372; and Key, American State Politics, p. 98.

<sup>2</sup>35 Cong. Rec. 3981 (1902) (remarks of Chauncey M. DePew).

<sup>3</sup>Forrest Crissey, Theodore E. Burton: American Statesman (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1956), p. 225.

as Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, who gave full support to the Amendment.<sup>1</sup>

While support for passage of the Amendment built up gradually within Congress and became an issue of contention among political parties, the movement outside the halls of Congress at the state and local level gained momentum more quickly. Between 1895 and 1908 thirty states had petitioned Congress to call a special Constitutional Convention to provide for the popular election of senators.<sup>2</sup> Emmet O'Neal, a U. S. Attorney from Alabama, commented on this national appeal and sympathized with the position taken by the Amendment's opponents:

. . . he who would challenge its [the Amendment's] wisdom or combat the arguments offered in its support incurs the risk of being classed as a traitor to the interests of the people, and denounced as the paid and selfish advocate of corporate greed.<sup>3</sup>

Voter support for passage of the Amendment was also evident in California in 1892, in Nevada in 1893, and in Illinois in 1902, where formal referenda supporting popular election passed by large majorities. Many states, primarily in the West, the North Central region, and in the South, sent memorials or petitions supporting the Amendment. All

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<sup>1</sup>Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), p. 49.

<sup>2</sup>Henry L. West, "Shall United States Senators Be Elected by The People?" The Forum, XLII (October 8, 1909), 293.

<sup>3</sup>Emmet O'Neal, "The Election of United States Senators by the People," The North American Review, CLXXXVIII (November, 1908), 702-03.

but four of the Southern states and all of the Western and North Central states requested the electoral change. The North Atlantic states, however, were unified in their opposition to the Amendment, except for Pennsylvania, which favored popular election sufficiently to petition the Congress.<sup>1</sup> The peak of favorable reaction for direct election was reached in the first session of the Fifty-second Congress when 7 memorials, 54 petitions, and 25 resolutions were received from state leaders.<sup>2</sup>

The campaign for Senate reform became so intense that a number of states became impatient waiting for the change. Instead of relying solely on congressional action, political leaders within these states took matters into their own hands prior to ratification of the Amendment and successfully modified indirect election of senators to suit their own needs.<sup>3</sup> Through the means of direct primaries and pledges of support solicited from legislative candidates, some state

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<sup>1</sup>Haynes' geographic divisions of the U. S. were as follows: Western states included: California, Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah; North Central states included: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska; Southern states included: Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Tennessee, and Kentucky; North Atlantic states included: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland.

Haynes, The Election of Senators, pp. 107-10.

<sup>2</sup>William H. Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism," The American Political Science Review, XLIX (June, 1955), 467.

<sup>3</sup>West, "Shall U. S. Senators Be Elected by The People?" p. 295.

governments and political leaders were able to severely limit Senate nominations and selections made by state legislatures. In Florida, for example, state legislators retained the full power of selection but they were strongly advised by political leaders to take into account the results of the popular vote. In Illinois, however, the public vote was thought to be binding on the legislators in their selections; and in Kansas the party nominee was that candidate who received the greatest number of votes in the greatest number of districts regardless of state legislative sentiment.<sup>1</sup> Probably the boldest alteration of indirect election was tried in Nebraska and Oregon. Not only did the voters choose the candidate by popular ballot in these states, but, in addition, the choice was ensured through one of two pledges which all state legislators were legally required to sign. One of the pledges, and the one most often selected, required the state legislator, under oath, to vote for the candidate who received the highest number of votes; the second statement, and the one which was rarely selected, promised only that the state legislator would consider the people's vote in making his decision.<sup>2</sup> In Alabama still another variation of indirect election was tried in 1906. Here it was the party that took complete charge of the nomination process. Not only did the party control the primary election, but the Democratic Executive Committee hamstrung the governor by forcing him

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<sup>1</sup>Fredrick A. Ogg, "The Problems of Our Senators," The World Today, March, 1911, p. 302.

<sup>2</sup>C. W. Fulton, "The People as Legislators," The North American Review, CLXXXV (May 3, 1907), 70.

to select one of two alternate candidates, who were chosen by popular vote, should a need arise to fill a Senate vacancy. Written pledges were also obtained from prospective gubernatorial candidates who had to promise, if elected, to select that alternate senatorial candidate to fill the first vacancy who had received the highest popular vote at the time of the primary. The second vacancy was to be filled by the alternate who received the second highest popular vote. If the candidates for governor refused to sign the pledge, their names were omitted from the primary ballot by the Democratic Party state committee.<sup>1</sup>

Pledges such as these indicated just how far some states were willing to go in order to secure popular election prior to 1913. Practices of this sort spread throughout the U. S. and became increasingly popular. Thus by December, 1910, it could be written in the Boston Herald, before any state legislature had yet convened, that: "Fourteen out of the thirty Senators who take the oath of office at the beginning of

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<sup>1</sup>O'Neal, "The Election of U. S. Senators by the People," p. 704.

Emmet O'Neal, disgusted with this plan, suggested: "This plan is entitled to the distinction of being the first instance in political history of the country where the Chief Executive of a state was coerced, by the arbitrary rule of a party committee, to abdicate one of the most important functions of his great office. He was forced in advance of his nomination to surrender a power vested alone in him by the Constitution of the United States."

O'Neal concluded: "A more perfect system of party tyranny could not well be conceived."

Ibid.

the next Congress, have already been designated by popular vote."<sup>1</sup>  
 On the wave of this overwhelming support for democratization, ratification for the Seventeenth Amendment by the required three-quarters of the states came quickly on May 31, 1913--a year after congressional passage.

#### Proponents' Hopes for the Consequences of the Amendment

Because the controversy over the Amendment was so intense and because its passage involved so many citizens in and out of government, it is no wonder that the anticipation of democratization within the Senate created optimistic hopes in the minds of its supporters as well as intense fears among its opponents. Hopes for the Amendment were grandiose. Its supporters had confidence that its passage would be instrumental in ultimately revitalizing and restructuring the entire political system. The Amendment was to be instrumental in revitalizing the system by eradicating the most frequently mentioned "evils" of politics including state legislative deadlocks, political graft, bribery, and corruption within state governments.<sup>2</sup> Of specific concern to the Amendment's proponents was the increased corruption in the Senate

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<sup>1</sup>Boston Herald, December 26, 1900, quoted in George Haynes, The Senate of The United States: Its History and Practice, I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938), 104.

<sup>2</sup>See E. G. Lowry, "Senators by Direct Vote," Harper's Weekly, February 16, 1911, p. 10; and Mitchell, "Election of Senators by Popular Vote," pp. 385-97.

elections themselves. Senator Joseph L. Bristow (R-Kans.) suggested that corruption had steadily grown worse over the years:

During the last forty years [prior to 1911] the Senate has had under consideration fifteen cases where corruption was charged in the election of Senators, while during the preceding eighty-four years of our history there had been but one such case.<sup>1</sup>

The function of the Amendment was plain. It would do away with the corrupt political environment in which the Senate nominations and elections had taken place and give the power of selection to the "uncorrupted" lay voter and, in so doing, obliterate political graft. In the words of Woodrow Wilson:

While it is true that when Amendment forces are awake they can conduct American processes without serious departures from the ideals of the Constitution, it is nevertheless true that we have had many shameful instances of practices which we can absolutely remove by the direct election of Senators by the people themselves.<sup>2</sup>

Regardless of how limiting this assessment was as to the cause and solution for political corruption, the hopes of the supporters did not cease with a desire to purify and invigorate the political environment. These hopes loomed much larger. This Amendment was looked to as a means of restructuring the political system. To accomplish this, the Amendment, in conjunction with such reforms as the direct primary, was to strike a lethal blow at the political party which had,

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<sup>1</sup>"A Review of the World," Current Literature, L (March, 1911), 253.

<sup>2</sup>Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1913), p. 234.

among other things, long been blamed by reformers for degrading the Senate and removing it from its once lofty status.<sup>1</sup> Samuel Hays intimated that the Seventeenth Amendment, as one of the Progressive reforms, acted as a decided threat to the party system as it had developed during the nineteenth century since it was, in effect, a demand that public decisions be made "through mechanisms other than the political party."<sup>2</sup> This Amendment was to strip party of its important powers of nomination, thus nullifying it as a "threat" to responsible government. David J. Rothman explained further that:

Certainly from their perspective, no reform could do more to return authority to the nation, releasing it from the grip of the party, than the direct election of the Senate.<sup>3</sup>

The ultimate desire on the part of some of the reformers was, no doubt, to fashion a political system without parties--and it was this Amendment that supporters believed, in the long run, would bring about such a system.

In addition to the destruction of party foretold as one of the consequences of passage, supporters contended that the passage of this Amendment would restructure the political system by altering the function of the state legislatures and their position within the political system.

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<sup>1</sup>Rothman, Politics and Power, p. 248.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel P. Hays, "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum," in The American Party Systems--Stages of Political Development, ed. by William Chambers and Walter Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 176-77.

<sup>3</sup>Rothman, Politics and Power, p. 259.



Upon passage of this Amendment, supporters argued, senators would no longer be forced to make account of their actions to state legislators and, hence, no longer would state legislators be concerned with national affairs.<sup>1</sup> Proponents predicted that the state legislators would thus be able to concentrate their efforts exclusively on state and local matters. Advocates of the Amendment claimed that this would have bearing on the equality of representation among states in Congress since all states would be assured representation in each Congress without the possibility of such election deadlocks as occurred in Delaware, California, Pennsylvania, and Utah in the Fifty-sixth Congress.<sup>2</sup> Supporters were confident that such a change in electoral methods would ensure representation in each state and, at the same time, would assure voters that state and local problems would be dealt with on a full-time basis within the state legislatures.

#### Opponents' Fears of the Consequences of the Amendment

These, then, were the benefits of passage promised by the proponents of this Amendment--promises to correct and remold much of the political system, but promises thought unfounded by the Amendment's opponents. Those in opposition to the Amendment strongly denied that there was a need for revitalization of the political system, but they did agree with proponents that a restructuring of the system

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<sup>1</sup>Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism," p. 455.

<sup>2</sup>Haynes, The Election of Senators, p. 62.

was indeed a probability if the Amendment were passed. Opponents feared, however, that if such a restructuring occurred it would prove to have dreadful consequences for the polity. Senator Chauncey DePew suggested the gravity of its ratification in these words:

You are at once opening the door for the wildest and widest revolution which has been suggested since the Constitution of the United States was adopted in 1787.

It is an extra-ordinary thing about that Constitution that its primary character has never been changed; that no amendment has been added to it in one hundred and fifteen years which has affected anything respecting its organic principles relating to the executive, legislative and the judicial branches of the Government. All the amendments added to it have related to matters of detail or to matters of suffrage.<sup>1</sup>

Senator George F. Hoar (R-Mass.) was even more sweeping in his allegations as to what might happen to the political system as a result of such an alteration in election methods:

Let no man deceive himself into the belief that if this change be made the Senate of the United States will long endure. Another legislative system will take the place of that which our fathers devised for us, and which for a hundred years has been the admiration of mankind. The method of election is indispensable to secure the peculiar quality of the body to be elected. The change will lead to an attempted overthrow of the equality of the Senate.<sup>2</sup>

Senators in opposition to the Amendment were concerned that passage would accelerate democratization of all institutions to such an extent that there would be no escape from it once the process began. The Amendment would, it was charged, ultimately lead to the

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<sup>1</sup> 35 Cong. Rec. 3981 (remarks of Chauncey M. DePew).

<sup>2</sup> 25 Cong. Rec. 106 (1893) (remarks of G. F. Hoar).

destruction of the Electoral College, impede the indirect selection of the federal judiciary,<sup>1</sup> and result in the total destruction of the federal system.<sup>2</sup> Opponents predicted a fusion of government powers, foresaw the destruction of legislatures, and feared the collapse of the entire governing process. In the words of Emmet O'Neal:

The next step that would inevitably follow would be the placing of all elections under national control, with the result that the rights of the states would be overthrown and a consolidated government erected on the ruins of our beautiful Federal system.<sup>3</sup>

Specifically, opponents indicated that the Amendment would alter the function of the Senate in relation to the rest of the political system. The Senate would no longer function as a distinct legislative unit acting as a check on the popularly elected House since both now would represent identical popular constituencies.<sup>4</sup> Emmet O'Neal intimated that without indirect election there would be no checking function at all:

It is difference in organization, the indirect election of its members, which is in fact the Senate's most distinguishing feature upon which largely depends the check on the action of the other House it was designed to accomplish.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

<sup>2</sup>O'Neal, "The Election of U.S. Senators by the People," p. 713.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Elihu Root, "Tampering with the Constitution," The Independent, March 9, 1911, p. 497.

<sup>5</sup>O'Neal, "The Election of U.S. Senators by the People," p. 709.

The Senate, the argument continued, would also cease to function as a deliberative body with the passage of the Amendment. Senators, who supported this view, contended that under the new Amendment senators would be dealing with a new type of constituent--one who was unfamiliar with the legislative process. This situation, they felt, would thus necessitate an explanation of each concession and act a senator engaged in and would bring a halt to free discussion within the Chamber.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to a concern for the function of the Senate, opponents charged that selection of senators by the general populace would be irrational since the state legislatures were well equipped and experienced to perform the nominating function while the general populace was in no way prepared to the same extent to assume such a responsibility. In the words of Senator Hoar:

It [the Amendment] would transfer practically the selection of the members of this body from the legislatures, who are intrusted with all legislative powers of the states, to bodies having no other responsibilities, whose election cannot be regulated by law, whose members act by proxy, whose tenure of office is for a single day, whose votes and proceedings are not recorded, who act under no personal responsibility, whose mistakes, ordinarily, can only be corrected by the choice of senators who do not represent the opinions concerning public measures and policies of the people who choose them.<sup>2</sup>

To take away this function from the state legislatures would, opponents felt, turn the legislatures into ineffectual policy-making institutions.

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<sup>1</sup>46 Cong. Rec. 2244 (1911) (remarks of Elihu Root).

<sup>2</sup>George F. Hoar, "Congressional Documents," in Selected Articles on the Election of United States Senators, ed. by C. E. Fanning (Minneapolis: H. W. Wilson and Co., 1909), p. 42.

Senator Elihu Root (R-N. Y. ) suggested that to strip such a power from the legislatures would, in effect, undermine their character beyond repair:

We can never develop competent and trusted bodies of public servants by expressing distrust in them, by taking power away from them, by holding them up to the world as being unworthy of confidence.<sup>1</sup>

Senators from the smaller states were particularly concerned as to the threat the Amendment posed for their Constitutional sovereignty. Spokesmen from the small states pointed out that without the pre-1913 Constitutional guarantee of an equal voice in the Senate, the larger states would unite and consistently override decisions made by the smaller states. This would, they felt, nullify the smaller states' rights. Senator Hoar argued that the individual states had never agreed to equality except under an arrangement of indirect election:

The states never consented to perpetual equality in a Senate made up in any other way or on any other principle of selection. They never agreed that there should be forever between New York and Maine an equality in a legislative chamber which is only a house of representatives made up of differently constituted districts.<sup>2</sup>

A New York Times editorial indignantly alluded to this dilemma when it asked: ". . . by what right now has Nevada (20,000) to have an equal voice in deliberation of the Senate with New York's 1,560,000 voters?"<sup>3</sup> As a result of such declarations, some thought the larger states would

<sup>1</sup>Root, "Tampering with the Constitution," p. 500.

<sup>2</sup>George F. Hoar, "Congressional Documents," p. 62.

<sup>3</sup>New York Times, April 10, 1913, p. 2.

no longer feel compelled to protect the Constitutional obligation of equal representation for the smaller states.<sup>1</sup> Senator Root, who strongly sustained this position, declared:

Let me tell the gentlemen who are solicitous for the preservation of the sovereignty of their states that there is but one way in which they can preserve that sovereignty, and that is by repudiating absolutely and forever the fundamental doctrine<sup>2</sup> on which this resolution [to amend the Constitution] proceeds.

Critics of the Amendment also feared that with its passage there would be a geographic reallocation of decision-making powers within Congress from rural to urban concentrations since in many states the urban population possessed the greater voting strength.<sup>3</sup> Ratification of this Amendment, opponents realized, would mean that the selection of senators would be taken from the hands of the rural-dominated state legislatures and put into the hands of the urban-dominated popular constituencies. Opponents claimed that the masses of urban voters would now exercise disproportionate decision-making influence in the selection of the senator. Again it was the Republican senator from Massachusetts, George F. Hoar, who declared:

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<sup>1</sup>25 Cong. Rec. 104 (1893).

<sup>2</sup>46 Cong. Rec. 2243 (1911) (remarks of Elihu Root).

<sup>3</sup>25 Cong. Rec. 104 (1893).

This allegation was particularly alarming when one considered the urban concentrations just prior to the passage of the Amendment. In 1910, for example, the State of Illinois recorded that 62 per cent of its people lived in urban places--areas of 2500 people or more--while 38 per cent lived in rural areas.

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1960, Vol. I: Characteristics of the Population, pt. 15, Illinois.

This proposed amendment requires the voice of the state to be uttered by masses of its citizens, and removes political power to the great masses who are collected in our cities. Chicago is to cast the vote of Illinois, Baltimore of Maryland, New York City of the state of New York, and Cincinnati of Ohio.<sup>1</sup>

#### Risks of Reform

Thus those senators most closely involved with this issue of direct election advanced arguments predicting that its passage had the potential of overturning or, at the very least, remaking the political system. But on the sheer basis of the passage of time, it is a simple matter to discover that the Amendment did not bring about all that its opponents and supporters had predicted. Indeed, on the basis of these predictions, the Amendment appeared to have failed to bring about these results more often than it succeeded. It had, for example, little effect in eradicating political corruption, as anyone reading a daily newspaper will agree, except to transfer its focus from a closed constituency of state legislators to an open mass constituency. In addition, the Amendment had also failed to deal a decided blow to party or to significantly cripple party organization within the Senate or state legislatures. Indeed, party leaders today still exercise influence over rank and file party members within the legislatures and the symbol of party continues to influence the lay voter in making his election choices. One positive result of the Amendment that supporters can point to, however, is that once the threat of state legislative deadlock ceased

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<sup>1</sup>George F. Hoar, "Congressional Documents," p. 65.

to be a problem in the selection of senators, each state has been assured two senators in each Congress since 1913 unless, of course, the death of one has intervened.

The predictions of the opponents of the Amendment, as well, seem to have had mixed successes. To be sure, predictions that passage of the Amendment would destroy state legislatures, bring a collapse to the governing processes, and encourage the conspiracy of large states against smaller ones have failed to come about. In addition, the assertion that popular election would destroy the dissimilarity between Senate and House has also proved to be unfounded since popular election has sustained these differences by providing the senator with a constituency unlike that of the congressman. Likewise, the allegation of Senator Hoar that passage of the Amendment would increase the importance of urban voters in the political system has only proved to be half true since their influence has never been united to the extent he had predicted. Rather, the political situation has been as V. O. Key, Jr., contended:

Ramparts are not erected where country meets city to divide the state sharply into two political groups. Rather, the typical pattern is that more than half of the metropolitan electorate leans in one direction whereas more than half the rural population leans in the other.<sup>1</sup>

Probably the most realistic assertion made by the opponents concerned the allegation that direct election was only one more step in the total

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<sup>1</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 295.



democratization of the entire federal system. With the current interest in the popularization of presidential elections within Congress and among the lay public, it would appear that the Seventeenth Amendment did indeed weaken resistance to further democratization and brought the polity one step closer to the development of the so-called "populist democracy."<sup>1</sup>

Although the effects of the Amendment seemed on the basis of these predictions somewhat disappointing in many cases, and wholly unfounded in others, part of the failure could be blamed on the predictors themselves. Most of the senators and legislators who ventured to speak in defense or in criticism of this Amendment were, after all, not gifted with the insights of political science and would not, in most cases, have possessed full knowledge of the interrelationships of the political system which could come through systematic study. They were, for the most part, politicians whose insights into the system were often confined to the limits of their positions and whose insights were also frequently colored with the desires to gain political reward. Consequently, when we look to the literature of politics rather than confining all our attentions to the assertions of congressmen, studies of similar institutional alterations would lead us to believe that such a modification in election procedure, precipitated by the Seventeenth Amendment, may well have significantly altered institutional ends,

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<sup>1</sup>See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, Phoenix Books (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), chap. 2, for a full discussion of this type of democracy.

norms, and values in directions not altogether predictable. Philip Selznick suggested, for example, that this very thing occurred within the Tennessee Valley Authority as soon as its leaders took steps to democratize by co-opting constituent spokesmen.<sup>1</sup> Selznick observed that because of TVA's commitments to its agricultural constituency, its program goals were reshaped, resulting in a failure on its part to give support to other New Deal administrative agencies. Instead, the TVA bowed to constituent pressures and aligned itself with the enemies of these agencies.<sup>2</sup>

Reforming an electoral system by changing it from a plurality to a proportional representation system, for example, can also be a risk since the change may cause the election of totally different types of candidates than would have been normally expected under a plurality system. In Great Britain, for instance, D. E. Butler felt that such a change of electoral systems, incorporating proportional representation as the new system, would probably have the following effects:

. . . under a different electoral system many people would have cast their votes differently. More candidates would have presented themselves, and electors, with the assurance that their votes would not be wasted, would have been more willing to give their first endorsement to forlorn hopes. But even if votes had been divided between the parties in just the same proportion as they were under the existing

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 263.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

system, there is no guarantee that PR would have distributed seats in exactly the same ratio as votes.<sup>1</sup>

And even a slight alteration of an electoral system can have unforeseen consequences. V. O. Key, Jr., intimated that by adding a run-off primary to an election, the result may well yield a different candidate than if only one primary were held among the same number of voters.<sup>2</sup>

Thus there is good reason for believing, based on these examples of change, that an alteration in the mode of election from selection of senators by state legislatures to popular election might create some important change in relationships within the political system.

#### Assessing Senate Democratization

The questions that the arguments of the opponents and supporters of this Amendment pose for the researcher are: Did this Amendment, in any way, "transmute" the Senate from an institution once divorced from popular control to an institution in conformance with "democratic" ideals? and more importantly, Did this Amendment in any way alter the "reality" of the Senate?<sup>3</sup> Because if it did, we would be able to gain invaluable insights into the realities of democratization--how it works and what its costs and benefits may be.

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<sup>1</sup>D. E. Butler, The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 190.

<sup>2</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 422.

<sup>3</sup>Refer to the opening quote.  
Key, American State Politics, p. 131.

Since the campaign to democratize the Senate covered such a lengthy period of time and because the results of the campaign were made public, a study of such a possible transmutation provides an opportunity rare in history to assess the impact of democratization over time. But there are difficulties, of course, in such an analysis. The Amendment, for example, was ratified at a time when other reforms were also imposed upon the electoral and governmental system. Ratification came, for instance, at a time when many states were either experimenting with or adjusting to direct primaries,<sup>1</sup> others had incorporated the initiative, referendum, and recall into their constitutions, and still other states had incorporated nonpartisan politics into the general scheme of state politics. Direct election, thus, was only one explicit change in the general democratic movement of the Progressive years. To isolate the specific results of this Amendment, therefore, often becomes difficult and, in some cases, impossible. In certain circumstances all that we may do is to gain some general feeling of the Amendment's importance through evidence based on the coincidence of one change with another or parallel developments in like institutions, through printed testimony of senators' observances of the Amendment's importance, and through logical implications.

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<sup>1</sup>By 1917, for example, 44 states were using the direct primaries; and of these, 32 had mandatory primaries covering all nominations for state offices as well as many local offices.

Charles E. Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 66.

Nevertheless, this Amendment stands as one of the few explicit manifestations of this democratic movement and therefore is well worth the investigative effort.

To determine whether the Senate was altered in any way by the Seventeenth Amendment, I shall focus my research on four major areas of significance which are intimately related to the Senate as an institution. These will include a study of: (1) the party organization--as a major influence on legislative behavior; (2) representation--as a major function of the legislature; (3) policy-making--as a major output of the legislative process; and (4) recruitment--as the staffing basis for the institution. The inquiry into these four areas will be advanced through the following four testable hypotheses:

HYP. I: As a result of the direct election of senators, there was an increased factionalization of party organization.


HYP. II: As a result of the direct election of senators, the ability of senators to represent state constituencies increased.

HYP. III: As a result of the direct election of senators, fewer senators, on entrance to the Senate, were prepared to handle the legislative responsibilities of the Senate.

HYP. IV: As a result of the direct election of senators, the office of senator became more accessible to potential candidates through a less rigid recruitment structure.

The basic examination procedure will be conducted through a series of comparisons before and after 1913--the year of the Amendment's ratification. Comparisons of over 700 senators from seven Congresses spanning sixty years have been used including data from the 49th Congress (1885-87), the 54th Congress (1895-97), the 59th

Congress (1905-07), the 64th Congress (1915-17), the 69th Congress (1925-27), the 74th Congress (1935-37), and the 79th Congress (1945-47). Some comparisons in the analysis, as Figure 1 makes clear, will be made between senators who sat in Congresses prior to 1913 as compared to senators who sat in Congresses after 1913. In such comparisons my objective will be to tabulate the sociological characteristics and observe the actions within the Senate of those senators elected by the state legislators before 1913 as compared to those senators selected by the voting public. These comparisons will be designated: "Senators selected by state legislators in the 49th, 54th, 59th, and 64th Congresses," and "Senators elected by direct election in the 64th, 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses." However, the analyses will not all be confined to the above two categories since if they were it would be impossible to isolate and carefully observe those senators who were popularly elected and who had never before been selected by state legislatures. For this further analysis, therefore, a distinction is made in the 64th, 69th, and 74th Congresses between personnel who were originally selected by state legislatures and personnel who had entered the Senate for the first time as a result of popular election. When these comparisons are made, they will be designated "Senators who first entered the Senate before 1913--all Congresses" as compared to "Senators who first entered the Senate after 1913 from the 64th, 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses." If direct election is significant in revising the system of representation, in causing changes in congressional



**KEY**



 Senators who first entered the Senate before 1913  
 Senators who first entered the Senate after 1913

Fig. 1. --Method of Analysis

procedure, and in influencing party organization, we may conclude that although the policy remained intact with the passage of this Amendment, it nevertheless had significant impact on the political system.



## CHAPTER II

### INFLUENCES OF DIRECT ELECTION ON PARTY ORGANIZATION

This constitutional reform [the Seventeenth Amendment] making the senator responsible to the people, accentuated his individualism, but it did not create it. It had a tendency, as the primary had had in the House, to undermine party solidarity but it did not start it.<sup>1</sup>

Ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment came at a time when parties were undergoing a number of stresses and strains within and outside of Congress. Outside Congress the two-party system, for all practical purposes, no longer existed but had been replaced by sectional parties. By 1900, in fact, most of the country was either one-party Democratic or one-party Republican. H. D. Price indicated that:

In the South the Negro had been finally removed as a political factor, and the Republican Party reduced to a nullity. In much of the North the nomination of William Jennings Bryan in 1896 had brought catastrophe to the Democrats.<sup>2</sup>

Schattschneider also observed that:

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<sup>1</sup>George R. Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), pp. 257-58.

<sup>2</sup>H. Douglas Price, "The Electoral Arena," in The Congress and America's Future, ed. by David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 37-38.

After 1896 there were large areas of the North in which the Democratic party virtually ceased to exist. In large areas of the North, Democratic representation in state legislatures became nearly extinct. In other places weak local Democratic organizations were absorbed by powerful Republican machines in bipartisan local systems.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of sectionalism, the Democrats controlled the South and a number of large Northern cities, while the Republicans had control of the rest of the country.<sup>2</sup> This condition almost destroyed minority party organizations in the states so affected because of the peculiar effect of one-party elections. In elections in one-party areas, Schattschneider explained, elections were "won not by competing with the opposition party but by eliminating it."<sup>3</sup>

Inside Congress the parties were also undergoing change. The authority of party leadership around the time of the ratification almost disintegrated. Although there was a formalization of institutional roles of "majority" and "minority" leaders after 1911,<sup>4</sup> senators in positions of party leadership never exerted as much individual authority over the rank and file that senators who acted as party leaders had exerted in earlier Congresses. Randall Ripley indicated that once the strong individual party leadership of such men as Nelson W. Aldrich

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<sup>1</sup>E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 85.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>The practice of electing a single majority and minority leader did not become established until the period between 1911 and 1913. Randall Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 26.

ceased with their departure from the Senate after 1911, factionalization of party leadership was the result:

And when Aldrich finally left the Senate as the last of "The Four" in 1911, the system of party rule he had headed for a quarter of a century swiftly disintegrated. It had been severely strained for several years by the growing numbers of insurgents in the party.<sup>1</sup>

This was followed by a period in the Senate wherein Progressive senators attempted to do away with the seniority system and, along with it, ultimately rid the committees of their senior committee chairmen.<sup>2</sup>

This, of course, further weakened party leadership in the Senate.

In addition to the weakening of party leadership during these years, party disunity had risen to an all-time high within both Houses of Congress at the time of the Amendment's ratification. Using A. Lawrence Lowell's party vote<sup>3</sup> as an index to measure party unity,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph S. Clark, The Senate Establishment (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> The party vote measures all votes in which more than 90 per cent of the members of one party vote in opposition to more than 90 per cent of the members of the other party. While there has been criticism of this index for not being able to account for party cohesiveness below a 90 per cent level, the weakness of the party vote is, nevertheless, also its strength since it allows the researcher to measure the frequency with which one party coheres at a maximum level in opposition to a second party. And its greatest benefit is that many political studies have successfully used this index in the past which allows us to make important comparative analyses over time.

See Lowell's original work where he developed the index in A. Lawrence Lowell, The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 324.

For a critical look at the party vote see Duncan MacRae, Jr.,

Figure 2 indicates that parties within both the House and the Senate became impressively disunited after 1896 to the extent that they were never again able to command the strong allegiances of their membership on roll calls that they had been able to command during periods previous to this time.

Parties in the Senate were particularly disunited after 1913. Looking only at Senate party activity, Table 1 makes use of Stuart Rice's "index of likeness"<sup>1</sup> as an index to measure the parties' similarities and differences on individual issues. The results from this table suggest that there was greater likeness between parties on individual issues after 1913 than there had been before 1913 in every issue category except for public works--a category that was not represented in one of the Congresses after 1913.<sup>2</sup> Party seemed to lose influence after 1913 on the very issues that one would expect party to have been strongest, i. e., foreign policy, the tariff, general government, and labor and education. This same result was replicated on a comparison of a composite of issues in Figure 3 wherein an "index of

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Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting: Methods of Statistical Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 178.

<sup>1</sup>The "index of likeness" is obtained by subtracting the percentage of "yea" votes cast by one party from those cast by the other party and subtracting the results from 100. Perfect "likeness" or similarity between parties is given a value of "100," while perfect dissimilarity equals "0."

Stuart A. Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups," Political Science Quarterly, XL (March, 1925), 64.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix I for a further description of the method of categorization used for this analysis.

KEY

- 1st session (House and Senate)
- - - 1st session (House and Senate) where missing data intervenes
- o 2nd session (Senate)
- x 2nd session (House)




Fig. 2. --Senate and House Party Voting Before and After 1913. (Sources: Senate voting data came from those Congresses specified in Fig. 1. Data for party voting in the House came from the following sources: A. Lawrence Lowell, The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1901 Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1902, 321-524; Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System [New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1956], pp. 394-95; and Duncan MacRae, Jr., Issues and Parties: Methods of Statistical Analysis [New York: Harper and Row, 1970], p. 202.)

TABLE 1  
INDEX OF LIKENESS ON SELECTED ISSUES WITHIN  
THE SENATE BEFORE AND AFTER 1913

Issues: <sup>a</sup>	Before 1913		After 1913		Total N
	No. of Issues	Average Index	No. of Issues	Average Index	
Tariff	124	.09	223	.57	347
Bureaucratic	17	.53	31	.53	48
Public Works	18	.60	28	.62	46
Education, labor and welfare	27	.30	25	.56	52
Gen. Govt.	19	.39	76	.63	95
Foreign policy	82	.31	36	.75	118
Taxes and economic	34	.42	25	.49	59
Total N	321		444		

Note:

All roll calls were used from each session of the following Congresses: Roll calls used before 1913 came from the 50th and 56th Congresses, while roll calls used after 1913 came from the 68th and 71st Congresses.

<sup>a</sup>The method used for categorizing these issues is discussed in Appendix I.




Fig. 3. --Senate Indices of Difference Before and After 1913. (Sources: Senate indices of difference were calculated from roll calls from those Congresses specified in Fig. 1. All roll call votes for both sessions were used for the 50th, 56th, 68th, and 71st Congresses, while only a sampling of roll calls were used from the first session of each Congress for the 49th, 54th, 59th, 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses. Average indices of difference in the Senate were calculated for the periods 1904-1910, 1911-1916, 1917-1920, 1921-1924, 1933-1934, and 1937-1940 were taken from data in John Bockover Johnson, "The Extent and Consistency of Party Voting in the U.S. Senate" [unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, March, 1943.] )

difference"<sup>1</sup> suggests that on all issues taken together the two parties in Congress were more similar in voting behavior and less cohesive within their own organization after the passage of the Amendment than before.

Since the trend in party disunity occurred in both Houses of Congress at about the same time, its cause was undoubtedly common to the parties in both Houses and may have been related either to the critical election of 1896,<sup>2</sup> or to the simultaneous decline in party leadership in both Houses of Congress,<sup>3</sup> or possibly to some historical

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<sup>1</sup>The computation of this index consists of taking the difference in the per cent of "aye" votes cast by two parties. A high remainder indicates greater dissimilarity while a low index number indicates greater similarity.

Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups," p. 64.

<sup>2</sup>Both V. O. Key, Jr., and Duncan MacRae, Jr., have advanced the theory of critical elections wherein partisanship irregularities over time coincided with certain critical elections which occurred in 1896, 1928, and probably in 1856 as well. Immediately after these elections, the theory states, the electorate was expected to reorient itself, making new demands on Congress. In the process of acting on these new demands, parties were expected to more easily cohere and partisanship was expected to rise accordingly.

V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, XVII (February, 1955), 4; and MacRae, Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting, p. 202.

<sup>3</sup>In both Houses of Congress crises in party leadership may explain part of this decline in partisanship. Within the Senate after 1911 the seniority system came under severe strains with Progressive senators attempting to do away with it. As well, Senate leadership continued to suffer during the twenties and thirties when both parties became faction-ridden within the leadership.

The same years were also critical for party leadership in the House. The House members adopted a resolution to remove the Speaker of the House in 1910 from the Rules Committee and assigned to the House as a whole the power to select members of the Rules Committee. Shortly thereafter, the House ceased to make use of the party caucus,



crisis during this period.<sup>1</sup> But whatever the exact cause, party disunity was a factor with which popularly elected senators had to deal. It existed previous to the ratification of the Amendment, and it became increasingly worse after popular election became the only method of election.

#### Direct Election and Party Strain

It seems only reasonable to suppose that changing the mode of senator selection to popular election, while not causing party disunity, did nevertheless contribute further to these stresses and strains of party. After all, party leadership within the state legislatures had, with the passage of this Amendment, lost control over the nomination and election of one of the most powerful elective offices. No longer could party leaders hand-pick Senate candidates as easily as they had

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the steering committee and other party control mechanisms. This further weakened party in the House.

Data on the Senate for these years came from Brown, The Leadership of Congress, p. 277; and "Calvin Coolidge Says," New York Herald Tribune, July 5, 1930, p. 1.

Data on the House came from Charles R. Atkinson, The Committee on Rules and the Overthrow of Speaker Cannon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911); and 45 Cong. Rec. (3425-26) (1910).

<sup>1</sup>Secondary peaks and troughs in partisanship as shown in Figure 2 may be related to crises of history such as war. During the Civil War period and prior to World War II indications are that such crises bring a greater unity between parties than otherwise would be expected. A certain cohesiveness of party may be seen just prior to World War I as well. This may indicate that such crises help to explain this pattern of partisanship over time.

done prior to ratification,<sup>1</sup> nor could they assure election to a particular candidate by packing a legislature with loyal partisans.<sup>2</sup>

Since the state legislature was probably not so important to the recruitment of senators after 1913, prospective Senate candidates lost the one single institution of party regulars that they could turn to for campaign support. Without these party ties to the state legislature, Senate candidates were probably forced to direct their appeal for campaign support to various segments of the party membership and the voting electorate. The result of such unrelated contact with the grass-roots by the senator was no doubt an eventual increase in the number of competing party factions supporting individual candidates. Rephrasing this supposition we might propose the following hypothesis:

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Orth suggested that prior to direct election party leaders often subjected recalcitrant state legislators to excessive pressures to force them to fall into line behind the election of a particular candidate:

"I know of an instance where the wife of a reluctant legislator was kidnapped and held prisoner for four hours in the room of a man who aspired to become, and did become, a United States senator. The political influence over the wife proved as potent as her influence over the husband." Samuel P. Orth, "Our State Legislatures," The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1904, pp. 735-36.

<sup>2</sup>This last tactic was one which Richard Pettigrew had advised Idaho's 1890 Senate candidate, George Shoup, that he should do in order to win election:

"If I were you . . . I would put a man in every single legislative district and have them report to you every day. They can assist the men in their election in the district. These fellows, so elected, will stay by you in the legislature." Richard Pettigrew to George Shoup, September 29, 1890, Pettigrew Papers quoted in David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The U.S. Senate, 1869-1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 177.

HYP. I: As a result of the direct election of senators, there was an increased factionalization of party organization.

The Amendment as a Contributor to Party Strain

One way we might proceed to determine whether parties did become more factionalized as a result of the introduction of the Amendment is to assess the senator's relationship to his party and to his colleagues after direct election and compare this relationship to conditions existing before 1913. If we find that senators grew more independent of one another with the ratification of this Amendment and that their relationship to their party within the Senate was more unsure and individualized after ratification, then we might assume that this Amendment indeed was instrumental in changing these relationships and in factionalizing party.

With the ratification of the Amendment, the relationship among senators did indeed grow increasingly distant. And it was the nature of the popular election itself that could partially be blamed for this development. Not only did the elections provide a popularly elected candidate for office, but they also, for the first time, totally isolated senators of the same state from one another and helped to dissolve any connections that might have existed between senior senators and Senate candidates. The staggered elections of senators, of course, had always assured that there would be at least two to four years difference between colleagues from the same state and had served to somewhat separate senators and their campaign organizations from those of their

colleagues. But when senators were selected by the state legislatures, this separation of years did not always prevent the senior senators from exerting undue influence over the selection of their junior colleagues. Rothman, for instance, suggested that in the years prior to the adoption of this Amendment:

Senators invariably helped select their junior colleagues for the difficulties of serving with an active rival in Washington were patent and to be avoided at all cost. They also supervised the legislature's choices for other, more abstruse, reasons. In many states powerful customs dictated a geographical division of the chamber seats, and senators did not wish to see anyone elected by chance from their particular region since that would only complicate their own re-election.<sup>1</sup>

But without the state legislature as a link in the senior senator's elective machinery, such control of election was not so feasible, particularly when the behavior of lay voters became the intervening variable to be considered. Thus the two to four years separation between Senate elections became a positive means of separation between senators after 1913, allowing each to become independent of one another.

Once in the Senate chamber, an indication of this new-found independence between colleagues after 1913 could easily be observed in the voting patterns of pairs of Senate colleagues from the same state. Table 2 indicates that voting homogeneity between Senate pairs was almost dissolved after direct election. There was, in fact, an immediate drop in intrastate agreements once the Amendment was passed. Fifty-five per cent of the senators voted more than 90 per cent of the

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

TABLE 2

VOTING AGREEMENT OF PAIRS OF SENATORS FROM  
THE SAME STATE ON SELECTED DOMESTIC  
ROLL CALLS, BEFORE AND AFTER 1913

Per cent of roll calls on which both senators voted on the same side of the issue <sup>a</sup>	Per cent agreement of those senators in the SAME party <sup>b</sup>		Per cent agreement of those senators in DIFFERENT parties <sup>b</sup>	
	Before 1913	After 1913	Before 1913	After 1913
over 90%	64%	41%	10%	2%
80-89	15	30	10	7
70-79	11	15	20	14
60-69	4	6	40	25
50-59	6	5	5	25
40-49	..	2	5	16
30-39	..	..	..	9
20-29	..	1	5	2
10-19	..	..	5	..
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N=106	N=100	N=20	N=43

<sup>a</sup>Roll calls selected for this table came from the 49th, 54th, 59th, 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses. Only roll calls were used wherein both senators recorded a vote, or both paired for or against the issue in question.

<sup>b</sup>Senators selected for analysis in this table came from the 49th, 54th, 59th, 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses.

time on the same side of an issue before 1913 as compared to 30 per cent of the senators voting on the same side of the issue after 1913. And this voting pattern of Senate pairs occurred regardless of whether the pair of senators belonged to the same or to different parties. Disunity among senators of the same party was particularly significant since it indicated that these senators grew increasingly independent of one another after 1913 regardless of party pressures. Identical results of pair voting were also borne out at an 80 per cent threshold level of agreement in Figure 4, wherein agreement decidedly decreased in all three Congresses after 1913 as compared to the level it had attained in the three Congresses prior to direct election. Voting relationships between Senate pairs thus seemed anything but cordial after 1913.<sup>1</sup> George R. Brown observed conditions of the Sixty-sixth Congress and noted:

Men like Beveridge and Dolliver, like Cummins and Norris, like Kenyon and Borah, took orders from nobody. Individualistic to an unusual degree, of exceptional talents of mind, of extraordinary firmness of character, such figures as these in the Senate marked it at once with a high distinction, not that all were of the same magnitude, for they varied in intelligence and in soul, but because they gave to the great<sup>2</sup> forum of the nation a contact with the masses of the people.

And George H. Haynes had noticed that by 1924 conditions were the same.

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<sup>1</sup>It is unfortunate that one cannot cross-check findings with House data to make sure that similar changes did not occur in both Houses of Congress. But data from the House would not be comparable since no two congressmen share the same constituency.

<sup>2</sup>Brown, The Leadership of Congress, p. 257.




Fig. 4. -- Voting Agreement of Pairs of senators from the same state on selected domestic Senate roll calls who voted 80 per cent or more of the time on the same side of the issue, by Congress.

Notes: A total of 78 roll calls were selected on the basis of final votes in the first session of each Congress. The number of pairs of senators involved in the voting included 126 pairs of senators before 1913 and 143 pairs of senators after 1913.

Haynes indicated that "Men who have watched Senators come and go for the past thirty years say, 'Now, it's every man for himself!'"<sup>1</sup>

The question that must next be posed is why this Amendment should have been instrumental in causing senators to grow more independent from one another after 1913. The answer, I believe, can be found in the circumstances surrounding the departure of senators from the state legislature after 1913. The Seventeenth Amendment virtually tore senators from the common ties with their tightly knit elite constituencies within the state legislatures and forced prospective Senate candidates to seek their own means of elective support. Once cut off from the state legislature, prospective Senate candidates tended to lose interest in this office as an office of recruitment, as shown in Figure 5. Only 39 per cent of those senators entering the Senate after 1913, for instance, had served in state legislatures as compared with over half of all senators entering the Senate before 1913. Before the ratification of this Amendment, as one writer indicated, conditions were such that candidates were particularly attracted to a state legislative career:

Since the legislatures have to choose the Senators, the would-be Senators make it their business to choose the legislatures.<sup>2</sup>


Although there were other reasons besides the change in the mode of election that contributed to this decline in association with the state

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<sup>1</sup>George H. Haynes, "The Senate: New Style," The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1924, p. 258.

<sup>2</sup>"The Progress of the World," The American Review of Reviews, XXVI (December, 1902), 644.





KEY



-  Senators who first entered the Senate before direct election
-  Senators who first entered the Senate after direct election

Fig. 5. --State legislative office experience of senators who first entered the Senate before 1913 compared to those who first entered the Senate after 1913. (Source: Based on Table 8 of this analysis.)

legislatures, as Chapter IV will detail, still the incentive to enter the state legislature became less intense after 1913, encouraging fewer senators to choose the state legislature as an office for advancement.

Thus popularly elected senators became cut off from their colleagues as well as the chief party stronghold that had often assured them of election or reelection--the state legislature.<sup>1</sup> And the immediate effect of this was, as George Brown observed after witnessing conditions in the Sixty-sixth Congresses, that:

The Senator came to think more in terms of himself and his own reelection, nearly always an impelling motive, and less in terms of party.<sup>2</sup>

#### A Need for an Election Organization after 1913

Rarely had a Senate candidate before 1913 needed to solicit much campaign assistance from sources outside the state legislature. The bulk of the resources for reelection could be found among the party leaders seated within the state legislatures.<sup>3</sup> But once senators had

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<sup>1</sup> There is no question that the principal function of the state legislature before 1913 was the selection of a U.S. senator. As George H. Haynes stated of the state legislator:

"He [the state legislator] can never lose sight of the fact that a chief, it may be the chief, consideration which led to his election was the reliance placed upon him to do his party service in voting for its candidate for the Senate; and, in consequence of this dominating task, almost every question before the legislature comes to take on a party color, as foreign to it in essence as could well be imagined."

George H. Haynes, The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1906), p. 189.

<sup>2</sup> Brown, The Leadership of Congress, p. 258.

<sup>3</sup> Rothman, Politics and Power, p. 175.

to worry on their own about reelection, outside support became absolutely essential to survive in public office.<sup>1</sup> Election was impossible, in fact, without some party organization in support of the candidate and reelection was just as difficult. H. C. Tillman suggested that:

Organization is half the battle. . . . When party organization is perfect, campaigns are more easily conducted and victory more certain.<sup>2</sup>

A firmly established campaign organization provided the senator a means by which he might survive the holocausts of the popular election including the uncertainties of scandals, the strategies of opposing candidates, Administration opposition, as well as the disadvantages of campaigning in an enlarged constituency. But this popular mode of election did not automatically provide such an organization for the candidate, nor did it provide a substitute for the election support that had been available in the state legislature. Rather, all that direct election provided the candidate was a gigantic mass constituency from which he was to fashion some sort of campaign organization if he was to win election. But such a constituency was fraught with problems as far as providing resources for fashioning a cohesive campaign organization. Constituency size

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<sup>1</sup>The desire to survive in office was equally as evident among popularly elected senators as it had been among senators chosen by the state legislatures. Randall Ripley suggested that there had been a continual increase in the number of years senators served since the 1890's, indicating the probability that senators after 1913 possessed an increased desire to retain office.

Ripley, Power in the Senate, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>H. C. Tillman to James McMillan, April 17, 1889, McMillan Papers, quoted in Rothman, Politics and Power, p. 166.

and heterogeneity made it difficult for a senator to build a secure political base focussing his attentions on his constituents.<sup>1</sup> And senators sensed this dilemma, as George R. Brown observed:

. . . their feet were planted upon a foundation less stable. All felt themselves at the mercy of their constituents, except perhaps a few coming from conservative states, where political conditions had not been disturbed so much, outwardly, at least, by the intellectual unrest of the people.<sup>2</sup>

#### Election Support within the Constituency

And where was the senator to look for resources to build a secure campaign base in a mass constituency? Well, party was still a dominant force in the constituency. And even though popular election had uprooted the senator from his connections with party in the state legislature and had probably eliminated certain pre-1913 party leadership positions connected with the state legislature,<sup>3</sup> the candidate could

<sup>1</sup>Malcolm Jewell indicated that because of the size and heterogeneity of the statewide constituency opposition in Senate contests is usually intense. As Jewell indicated:

"Out of almost 700 senatorial elections held from 1920 through 1962, nearly one-third were won by less than 55 per cent of the two party vote (almost evenly divided between Republican and Democratic victories). The Republicans won another one-fourth by larger margins (19 per cent by a margin of 55 to 69 per cent, and only 6 per cent by 70 per cent or more). The Democrats won 43 per cent by larger margins (23 per cent by a margin of 55 to 69 per cent, and 20 per cent by more than 70 per cent, many of these in Southern states without any opposition)."

Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 78.

<sup>2</sup>Brown, The Leadership of Congress, p. 273.

<sup>3</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., suggested that:  
"Thus the introduction of the popular election of United States Senators may have eliminated centers of state leadership that

look for party support after 1913 within the state party organizations-- many of which were just beginning to be rebuilt. Although congressional parties appeared to be fragmented and bimodelism within each congressional party had been encouraged by the divisive effects of the Amendment, as Figure 3 has suggested, this did not necessarily mean that party in the constituency had lost its influence. On the contrary, it may have meant that during this period just after 1913 party influence actually increased within the constituencies as a result of the added political activity of the individual candidates which shortly culminated in the defeat of sectionalism and the regeneration of the two-party system within a majority of the states. In the strongly Republican state of Vermont, for example, the Republican majority became somewhat less strong; and the weakened minority Democrats gained strength and began to regularly support candidates for office shortly after 1913. Lockard reported that:

Since the first primary election in 1916 the Democrats have never once failed to make a nomination for any statewide office in any election, regular or special.<sup>1</sup>

In other former one-party strongholds, as well, new statewide elections

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took steps to assure that a legislative candidate ran in almost every district. While this constitutional change probably was of significance for the organization of state politics, had it been controlling, the Connecticut party organization would have atrophied in a manner similar to the state organizations in states using the direct primary."<sup>1</sup>

V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 192.

<sup>1</sup>Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 29.

for senator gave minority voters added impetus to revive their interest in party and party activity by giving them a renewed hope for electing a candidate to an important political office. This was particularly true of minority parties within the cities where there was a potential of gaining additional strength from a statewide vote for senator, as occurred in the first Illinois popular election for senator in 1914. When the normally insignificant Republican vote of Chicago and Cook County, for example, was added to the statewide total vote of Republican Senate candidate Lawrence V. Sherman, it proved to be the winning margin of victory in his successful election campaign against Democrat Roger C. Sullivan.<sup>1</sup>

Other signs of renewed party competition were also seen by Richard E. Dawson at the state level in gubernatorial and state legislative elections during the 1914-1929 period.<sup>2</sup> And indications were that senators did indeed take advantage of the renewed state party organizations, looking to them for added support. At least 50 per cent of the senators after 1913, for instance, declared in biographical data that they had been "active participants"<sup>3</sup> within their state parties

<sup>1</sup>Illinois, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1915 (Danville, Ill.: Illinois Printing Co., 1916), p. 694.

<sup>2</sup>Richard E. Dawson, "Social Development, Party Competition, and Policy," in The American Party Systems--Stages of Political Development, ed. by William Chambers and Walter Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 217.

<sup>3</sup>"Active participation" refers to any participation of the senator within the party organization ranging from attending a party convention to holding party office at any level.

prior to Senate election.<sup>1</sup> Thus even though ratification of the Amendment had cut off senators from the party leadership within the state legislatures, they could now look to the newly strengthened state party organizations for assistance in building up their grass-roots organizations within the popular constituency.

In addition to the state party organizations, popularly elected senators could also depend on certain nonparty voluntary committees within the electorate for election support. These organizations began to develop within the constituencies shortly after direct election was instituted. In California and Wisconsin, for instance, these groups were particularly notable for their effectiveness. In Wisconsin a Republican voluntary committee was organized in opposition to the LaFollette leadership and proved to be fairly successful in their venture.<sup>2</sup> And of the California voluntary committee movement, V. O. Key, Jr., stated:

Again, a concern with nominations and a fairly high degree of policy homogeneity characterize the new organizations. Whether these instances portend the shape of party reconstruction, they reflect experimentation among politicians in quest for a mode of action appropriate to the new circumstances.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Of 314 senators who first entered the Senate after 1913, 50 per cent considered themselves "active participants" in their party. This compared to 51 per cent of 388 senators studied prior to 1913.

<sup>2</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 343.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 344.

One final source that the popularly elected senator might depend upon for campaign support was the resources of major interest groups.<sup>1</sup> Of course, interest groups had been strong within the states before 1913 and had been involved in senatorial politics. George R. Brown observed that prior to 1913:

The railroad power in some states had been supreme. It had all but usurped the very sovereignty of government. It controlled legislatures. It corrupted voters. It packed the county caucuses with hirelings of ward bosses, and determined which men should, and which could not, go to state capitals, and to the United States Senate.<sup>2</sup>

And once in the Senate, senators often became leading spokesmen for these professional groups. As Herbert Agar related:

A United States senator . . . with few exceptions, represented something more than a state, more even than a region. He represented principalities and powers in business. One senator, for instance, represented the Union Pacific Railway System, another the New York Central, still another the insurance interests of New York and New Jersey. Here, out of the West, came not one but a group representing the Southern Pacific. The Santa Fe divided, with the Gould system, an interest in another. Coal and iron owned a coterie from the Middle and Eastern seaport states. Cotton had half a dozen senators. And so it went. These senators either had campaign contributions directly from the great business interests which they openly championed; or the attorneys for these interests, controlling state conventions and legislatures,

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<sup>1</sup>Interest group here is defined as "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes."

David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Brown, The Leadership of Congress, p. 127.



named these senators, and so owned them. It was a plutocratic feudalism, not rigidly organized, but eminently respectable.<sup>1</sup>

But even though interest groups managed to gain spokesmen within the Senate, once the senator was elected actual interference by these groups in the election process within the state legislatures was rather rare.

Rothman explained that prior to 1913:

Senators also enjoyed a great deal of freedom from economic as well as political pressures. During the last decades of the century, business interests frequently meddled in state affairs, but insofar as Senate elections were concerned, their achievements were not often notable. The influences they exerted were balanced by the strength of political organizations,<sup>2</sup> and party leaders were not compelled to defer to their demands.

Rothman suggested further that it was an exception before 1913 for corporate interests to dominate proceedings in state assemblies:

In most states a wide range of interests tried to influence the power structure, and no one group could be confident that its demands would be favored. In New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, California, and Oregon, all sorts and sizes of manufacturing, transportation, banking, mining, real estate, mercantile and agrarian enterprises took some active part in politics; and their aims were by no means identical. . . . Even giant insurance companies, for example, preferred national regulation to state control because the difficulties<sup>3</sup> of dealing with several legislatures were too burdensome.

With the change in electoral methods, however, interest groups could now directly confront the individual senators at the initial stage of the election process, playing a more vital part in their election and becoming an integral part of their campaign organization.

<sup>1</sup>Herbert Agar, The Price of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 579-80.

<sup>2</sup>Rothman, Politics and Power, p. 183.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 184-85.

Popular Election and Party Factionalization

Thus in forcing senators to fend for themselves in the mass constituency, popular election inadvertently opened up the election process to new elements within the party as well as inviting nonparty elements to participate. The impact of such action on party was not unlike those results observed of the effect of the direct primary on party, i. e., a factionalization of party. V. O. Key, Jr., in talking of the effects of the direct primary, pointed out that:

Under the direct primary, centers of informal leadership-- often but not always a new system of cliques--developed within the stronger party to plead the cause of aspirants for the nomination before the electorate--or at least before that part of the electorate entitled to vote in the primary.<sup>1</sup>

The Seventeenth Amendment, as had the direct primary, also forced candidates to make individual appeals to the party membership and to the electorate at large. And there is every reason to believe that this contact with the electorate also encouraged centers of informal leadership to arise within the party as a result of this contact. And similarly, popularly elected senators, forced to seek support outside strong party centers, probably also posed a challenge to established party hierarchies in the same way as other candidates selected through the direct primaries had done. Key again reiterated, in talking of the direct primary, that:

Statewide party hierarchies seem to disintegrate under the impact of the influences given free play by the primary. They cannot thrive under repeatedly successful assaults upon

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<sup>1</sup>Key, American State Politics, p. 97.

their proposals by those who, on the basis of some special or parochial appeal, can manage to win nominations through the primary. Only under rather exceptional sets of circumstances-- of party homogeneity, of monopolization of sources of campaign funds, of common desire for victory--can formal party leadership maintain much control over the nominating process. The more common tendency seems to be that competing centers of power--competing informal hierarchies based on localities, regions, groups, personal followings--develop their electoral support in the direct primary.<sup>1</sup>

Yes, new conditions of election had been created by the direct primary as well as this Amendment. And both direct election and the direct primary forced party to operate under them. The result of these new conditions created by the Amendment helped to change the organization of party and, by forcing the candidate to search out his own election organization, seemed to have contributed to party's overall factionalization. It thus seems reasonable to assert that this Amendment contributed its share to shaping the changes that came about in twentieth century party organization as described by Key in this observation:

Although we have no precise measure of the change, clearly over the past 50 years American party organizations have undergone radical alterations. Tightly managed statewide party organization has become exceptional and has been largely replaced by a factionalized system of personal and factional cliques of professionals within each party. Within cities and counties the same process of atomization has occurred, even though a few old-style machines remain. Along with these changes the capacity of the party organization to control nominations has declined markedly, and primary routs of famed old machines by upstarts recur. Politicians are not disappearing, to be sure, but the manner of their organization and of their operation is changing.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

<sup>2</sup>Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, p. 341.

## CHAPTER III

### DIRECT ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION

Whenever the concept of representation is mentioned to the voting public, chances are that most voters will conceive of it in terms of particular personal characteristics they wish to see possessed by their representatives. Enough voting studies have been conducted over the years that confirm this to be so. A representative's ethnicity, race, religion, and occupation, according to these studies, are thought to be vital to election victory and are thought important to the voters feeling "represented" in the legislative assembly.<sup>1</sup> The rationale behind this view, of course, is the feeling that the more a legislative assembly mirrors the characteristics of the electorate, the more closely the policy preferences of the assembly in question will parallel the preferences of the electorate. Of course, while this may be so, no

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<sup>1</sup> See the following voting studies as examples:

Paul Lazarsfeld, The People's Choice (3rd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

Angus Campbell, et. al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960).

R. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," The American Political Science Review, LIX (December, 1965), 896-908.

such assurance exists. In criticism of this view of representation, Hanna Pitkin has stated:

Rather, it depends on the representative's characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing something. The representative does not act for others; he "stands for" them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or reflection. In political terms, what seems important is less what the legislature does than how it is composed.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, not all social characteristics need be actually represented in an assembly in order that a particular viewpoint, aspiration, or opinion be defended. In fact, even if it were possible to have all characteristics actually represented in the person of representatives, it would in no way assure that a representative relationship between constituent and representative would exist. As Pitkin phrased it:

In the realm of action, the representative's characteristics are relevant only insofar as they affect what he does. Thus, for the activity of representing, the ideal of a perfect copy or likeness is chimerical.<sup>2</sup>

#### Representation as "Activity"

It is this "activity of representing" rather than other views of representation which will be the concern of this chapter. Pitkin offered a definition of representation which she called "acting for-representation"<sup>3</sup> that does, in fact, incorporate this activity of representing as its central theme. Representation, according to this

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<sup>1</sup>Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 61.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

definition, is concerned with the nature of the representative activity itself, with what goes on during the act of representing and with the relationship between the agent as he "acts for" the principal. "Acting for-representation" implies particular obligations and behavior on the part of the representative.<sup>1</sup> Pitkin clarified the relationship between the representative and those represented in these words:

He need not actually and literally act in response to the principal's wishes, but the principal's wishes must be potentially there and potentially relevant.<sup>2</sup>

A representative must, in other words, maintain a constant condition of responsiveness or readiness to respond to the wishes of the constituency in order for actual representation to exist. Acting against the wishes of the constituency is not necessarily wrong, nor a violation of the duty of a representative, but it does place the responsibility of explanation and justification on the part of the representative. Representation occurs, therefore, when a representative has "promoted the objective interest of those he represents."<sup>3</sup>

#### Direct Election and "Acting For-Representation"

With this definition in mind, then, it would be well to consider what such a change in election methods that resulted from the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment might have done to alter the representation of state constituents. Once senators were directly elected by the state's voters it is reasonable to suppose, for example,

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

that the voters would be more adequately represented than they had been before 1913. After all, the senator's attention could now be focussed directly on the state itself and its voters without the interference of an intermediary institution such as the state legislature. Because senators prior to 1913 owed direct allegiance to the state legislators, the temptation to ignore the state's voters in preference to the wishes of the state legislators was probable. In addition, the voters of the state might look forward to more adequate representation after 1913 because of their newly acquired sanction to control the election of the senator. If the senator would not act in an acceptable manner according to the voters' wishes, he could be removed. While this sanction may not have been as satisfactory as the "instructions" that state legislators used to notify senators of their wishes prior to 1913, it nevertheless was more control than the state's voters had ever exerted over their senator prior to 1913. This sanction would also give the senator additional incentive to more adequately represent his new state constituents, knowing that his future tenure depended upon it. Thus, based on these expectations, it might be hypothesized that:

HYP. II: As a result of the direct election of senators, the ability of senators to represent state constituents increased.

#### The Senator as a Personality Type

One method of analysis that we might employ to test this hypothesis is to analyze the relationship of the senator to his

constituency before and after 1913, noting especially whether conditions were such as to permit unrestricted representation. If, for example, Senator A, who was popularly elected, seemed to adapt well to the new popular constituency and was able to establish contact with his constituents, we might presume that he had a greater potential for directly representing his state's inhabitants than Senator B, who was selected by a state legislature and who was somewhat removed from the state electorate. If, however, Senator A was ill adapted because of experience or background to the conditions of the popular constituency and Senator B because of his experience was able to gain an understanding of state problems and work well with those state inhabitants with whom he came in contact, we might presume the opposite conclusion.

To begin with, one must look at both the senator who served before and the senator who served after 1913 and consider what type of representative he made. Since no survey data existed during the time in question, the best we can do is make a few general observations.<sup>1</sup> For this comparison I should like to borrow Robert Merton's distinction of personality types and apply them to the Senate before and after direct

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<sup>1</sup>To determine a senator's "personality type" without possessing survey data must necessitate taking certain liberties. But in making the generalizations which appear within the chapter, the writer realizes that a senator's perspective of the world may well be determined by a number of unmeasurable factors besides the more obvious ones which may be pinpointed and systematically observed on the basis of biographical data available. Only when this caveat is acknowledged by the reader can these generalizations be considered within the proper perspective. Consequently the conclusions derived on the basis of the indices used in this section may in certain cases be tentative.



election.<sup>1</sup> Merton maintained that within any social community there are two distinct personality types--the "local influential" and the "cosmopolitan influential." Each type of influential is involved in distinct human relationships consisting of particular values, perceptions, and experiences. The local influential confines his interests to primary interpersonal relationships, is limited in his mobility, is preoccupied with affairs of his personal life, and normally lives and enters the labor market in an area near his birthplace.<sup>2</sup> The cosmopolitan influential, on the other hand, limits his personal relationships with others, involving himself more in impersonal contacts. He is generally more mobile, can extend himself beyond his own immediate needs, and seeks to influence others on the basis of previous achievements and developed skills. The cosmopolitan influential, Merton continued, had a following of admirers because he knows, while the local influential had admirers because he understands.<sup>3</sup> Merton suggested further that:

Interpersonal influence stemming from specialized experience typically involves some social distance between the advice-giver and the advice-seeker, whereas influence stemming from sympathetic understanding typically entails close personal relationships. The first is the pattern of the cosmopolitan influential; the second, of the local influential.<sup>4</sup>

A look at Figure 6 indicates that the personnel who sat in the Senate prior to 1913 tended to be recruited from cities and towns of greater size than one would have expected compared to the settlement


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<sup>1</sup>Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 400.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 403.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.



KEY

o Census before 1913

x Census after 1913

— Senators before 1913

- - - Senators after 1913

Fig. 6.--The size of the city or town wherein senators lived at the time of their election compared to the National Census average before and after 1913. (Source: Census averages came from figures for the years 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1950.)

patterns of the general population. The pattern after 1913 is much the same except for the increase in the percentage of senators selected from cities of over 100,000 population. Although an overwhelming number of these senators both before and after 1913 had been born in rural territories and towns of less than 2500 people,<sup>1</sup> these same senators soon moved to urban surroundings.<sup>2</sup> This movement was partly due, no doubt, to the demands of the senators prepolitical occupations which were, in more than half the cases, related to the practice of law.<sup>3</sup>

Although a good share of the senators lived in larger cities and towns at the time of their election, this did not necessarily mean that they were as mobile in their life-style as one might expect urban

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<sup>1</sup>I have used the terms "urban" and "rural" as the Census Bureau has defined them. They designate an urban place to be a place of 2500 residents or more.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix VII for a comparison of the size of birthplaces of senators selected by state legislatures and those who entered the Senate by popular election.

<sup>3</sup>The law profession as a whole has centered itself in the larger metropolitan areas over the years. Winfield reported, for example, that 46 per cent of all nonsalaried lawyers in 1947 practiced in cities of a quarter of a million or more in population.

W. Winfield, "Incomes of Lawyers," Survey of Current Business, XXIX (August, 1949), p. 22.

A. P. Blaustein also suggested that as of 1952, 52 per cent of 204,111 lawyers listed in Martindale-Hubbell legal directory practiced in cities with a population of over 200,000, while 48 per cent practiced in smaller communities.

A. P. Blaustein and C. O. Porter, The American Lawyer: A Summary of the Survey of the Legal Profession (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 4.

residents to be. For the most part, in fact, senators before and after 1913 preferred to cement ties to their home states and rarely exited therefrom for any extended periods. Indications of this may be seen in the following analysis based on a study of several years ago authored by Andrew Hacker.<sup>1</sup> Hacker charted the geographic mobility of the senators of the Eighty-sixth Congress from birthplace to address of last residence through the establishment of four "compass points." These points included: (1) the town where the senator was raised; (2) the town where he went to college (if he went to college); (3) the town where he attended graduate school; (4) the town of his current residence before his death. Based upon these "compass points," Hacker then separated the senators into four major categorical types. For my purposes, I have followed similar "compass points," but separated the senators into the following five categories: (1) Non-leavers--those whose hometowns, colleges, high schools, or business schools and town of last residence before death were all in the same state; (2) Temporary leavers--those whose hometowns and town of last residence before death were in the same state, but who traveled elsewhere to college, high school, or business school, or who traveled outside the state for any extended period; (3) Early leavers--those whose hometowns, college, high school, or business school and addresses of last residence before death were all in different states; (4) Late

<sup>1</sup>Andrew Hacker, "The Elected and the Anointed: Two American Elites," The American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 545.

leavers--those who went to college or secondary school in their home states but at the time of their death resided in another state; and finally (5) Early leavers and stayers--those whose hometowns were different from their last residence before death, their high school and their business school.

In general, as Table 3 denotes, few senators who were popularly elected left the state of their birth. Of those who did leave, a

TABLE 3  
GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY OF ALL SENATORS TO AND FROM  
THE STATE OF THEIR BIRTH

Mobility	Senators who first entered the Senate BEFORE 1913 (Per cent)	Senators who first entered the Senate AFTER 1913 (Per cent)
<u>(Returners)</u>		
Non-leavers	30%	38%
Temporary leavers	16	21
<u>(Non-returners)</u>		
Early leavers	26	21
Late leavers	19	10
Early leavers and stayers	9	10
Totals	100%	100%
	N=389	N=198

good number left only temporarily. As far as their residential settlement patterns were concerned, the comparison in Table 4 demonstrates

TABLE 4  
DISTANCE IN MILES FROM THE BIRTHPLACE OF THE SENATORS  
TO THEIR RESIDENT ADDRESS AT THE TIME OF DEATH

Locations	Senators who first entered the Senate BEFORE 1913 (Per cent)	Senators who first entered the Senate AFTER 1913 (Per cent)
Same town	17%	23%
Under 100 miles	26	31
100 - 500 miles	19	24
Over 500 miles	38	22
Totals	100%	100%
	N=388	N=196

that 43 per cent of the senators selected prior to 1913 and 54 per cent of the senators selected by popular vote lived under 100 miles from their birthplaces, suggesting again the limited mobility of senators and their desire to establish ties to their immediate surroundings.

Thus on the basis of these mobility and geographic indices, few definitive statements regarding the typical Senate personality type for these two periods can be rendered. One sees evidences in the lifestyles of senators both before and after 1913 which reflect traits of both "local influentials" and "cosmopolitan influentials," since the

majority of senators appeared to have come into contact with both urban and rural influences in their associations. Consequently, before we can draw any finer distinctions, it seems proper to introduce a third dimension--a dimension peculiar only to senators and their life-styles.

To consider senators as simply typical local or cosmopolitan influential laymen would be, I think, misleading. After all, many of them were professional politicians--homos politicos,<sup>1</sup> if you will--men who had been exposed to a great variety of political experiences during their careers prior to their election to the Senate. These were generally men who entered politics at an early age,<sup>2</sup> and spent a good share of their working lives in politics. In addition, their chances of staying in the Senate for extended periods appeared favorable. Those senators who had gained experience in local, state, and federal offices or who had served for several terms in the Senate would be more prone to broaden their perspectives and outlook beyond those of senators and laymen who had not had this experience. As Table 5 indicates, there were senator politicians from both urban and rural areas who appeared to have had similar political experiences during their pre-senatorial careers at all levels of politics before and after direct election.

Thus when analyzing Senate personality types it would seem we would draw a closer parallel to reality if we broadened Merton's

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<sup>1</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 223.

<sup>2</sup>Some 54 per cent of 268 senators selected by state legislatures, and 45 per cent of 325 senators popularly elected entered politics before they were 30 years of age.

TABLE 5  
 PRE-SENATE POLITICAL OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF  
 URBAN AND RURAL ORIENTED SENATORS  
 BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT  
 EXPERIENCE

(in per cent of those who held office)

Level of Experience <sup>a</sup>	Senators selected by state legislatures (Per cent)		Senators popularly elected (Per cent)	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Federal	40%	53%	37%	39%
State	83	82	60	72
Local	46	36	37	47
	N=52	N=220	N=111	N=217

Note:

Because of multiple offices held by senators, percentages are not additive.

<sup>a</sup>Political offices included in these classifications are:  
Federal level: federal legislative and administrative offices.  
State level: state legislative, law enforcement, statewide elective, and administrative offices.  
Local level: local elective and administrative offices.

classifications and created two additional categories taking into account political experience and combining the characteristics of Merton's two original classifications. We might, therefore, term these new categories: "cosmopol-local" and "loco-cosmopolitan" influentials. The loco-cosmopolitan senator, in the conceptualization depicted in Figure 7, would thus assume the narrow and limited views of the local influential



		<u>Political Experience</u>	
		(none/limited)	(varied/long)
<u>Origin</u>	Rural	local influential	cosmopol-local
	Urban	loco-cosmopolitan	cosmopolitan influential

Fig. 7.--Senate influential classification, by origin and political experience.

even though he retained residence in an urban area; while the cosmopol-local, although spending most of his life within a rural area, would have the characteristics of the cosmopolitan influential gained through political experience. We might, therefore, modify our former conclusion and suggest--again based on the mobility and geographic indices but adding political experience as a third variable--that in addition to the preponderance of "local influentials" who occupied the Senate before and after 1913, there were also, no doubt, a good number of "cosmopol-locals" born in the same areas as the local influentials but who had had political careers which broadened their perspectives on the world about them.

#### The Senator and His Constituency

Although the senator did not seem to change his personality type with the adoption of the Amendment, constituency conditions did change. And they changed radically. Conditions before 1913 favored the local influential senator, who could comfortably handle the face to

face interpersonal relationships demanded of a constituency made up of a mere handful of state legislators. But after 1913 popular election brought candidates to the Senate who were forced to engage in totally different interpersonal relationships with their constituencies. The senator after 1913 was made accountable to a constituency that grew to unmanageable proportions, a constituency made up of millions of voters in a territory of perhaps thousands of square miles. In Illinois, for instance, this constituency increased from just over 200 prior to 1913 to over one million in the voting constituency and nearly six million inhabitants in the entire statewide constituency.<sup>1</sup> The very act of expanding the constituency changed the quality of human relationships needed to deal with the expansion. No longer did the senator's constituency consist of a closed community of human relationships. Now a new type of cosmopolitan relationship evolved, divorcing the senator from the close ties he had had once with his constituents. Contact with

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<sup>1</sup>This estimate is based upon the size of the Illinois General Assembly in 1911 which totaled 204 legislators, and the size of the voting constituency for the governor--an identical constituency for popularly elected senators in 1916. This figure totaled 1,253,189. Included also in these figures is the population of Illinois for 1910, which was approximately 5,639,000.

For data on the Illinois General Assembly see: Illinois, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1911 (Danville, Ill.: Illinois Printing Co., 1911), p. 22.

For data on the size of the voting constituency of the governor see: Illinois, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1919 (Springfield, Ill.: State of Illinois, 1919), p. 597.

For data on the population of Illinois in 1910 see: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1969 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 14.

constituents after 1913 had to come principally through indirect means-- telegrams, letters, phone calls, the mass media. Limited time, large territories, and a greater social class heterogeneity within the enlarged constituency made face to face contact with constituents less and less a reality. Problems were remote and distant from personal experience. In short, the constituency was ripe for the cosmopolitan influential to replace the local influential as senator since the larger constituency might destroy the most effective means by which the typical local and possibly the loco-cosmopolitan influential dealt with other people-- close personal relationships and sympathetic understanding.

The Senator as a "Politician" in the Mass Constituency

Although the new expanded constituency promised to create adverse conditions for many representatives due primarily to its size, the reader might reasonably presume that those senators who were "professional politicians" could probably find ways and means to circumvent these difficulties. After all, Robert Dahl had claimed that professional politicians were indeed a breed unto themselves, with strong motivations to learn the skills necessary to succeed in their chosen field and with a great deal of time to devote to this purpose.<sup>1</sup> Yet this explanation overlooks a number of important conditions existent in the mass constituency. For one thing it overlooks the fact that no matter how many resources a senator commanded nor how many

<sup>1</sup>Dahl, Who Governs? p. 307.

skills he had in his possession, it would aid him little in "acting for" his constituents in a representative relationship unless he was able to use these resources to help him communicate with his constituents and understand their needs and wishes. And for the professional politician who was used to dealing with constituents in an entirely different type of political system this would not be so easy. Changing the constituency into an open mass constituency, for example, made it necessary for senators to make use of different techniques of communication to reach their new constituents. No longer would the professional politician be able to rely exclusively on manipulation, bargaining, cajoling, and the skills of closed politics that he knew best,<sup>1</sup> since these were not the techniques required of a senator acting in a mass constituency. In open politics the projection of a senator's approach to his constituents must be outward, and opinions must be sought publicly from his constituents through such means as the mass media. Dahl suggested the importance that mass media plays in an open constituency in these words:

The media of mass communications--newspapers, radio, television, and magazines--enjoy a unique immediacy and directness in their contact with citizens. They regularly

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<sup>1</sup> The terms open and closed politics were first alluded to by C. P. Snow in The Masters (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1951). These terms were also referred to by Philip Selznick in The Organizational Weapon (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), but it was not until they were delineated by Duncan MacRae, Jr., that they became useful terms for use by political scientists. In closed politics, for example, issues are not made public and political strategies of politicians are usually confined to the caucuses and the smoke-filled rooms. In open politics, however, issues are made public and the political strategies used by the politicians are made to appeal to the public consensus.

and frequently enter the homes of citizens: newspapers once or twice a day, magazines once a week, television and radio several hours a day. They do not force their way in; they are invited. They receive the willing and friendly attention of the household; they are, presumably, welcome guests.<sup>1</sup>

And communication in the mass media is quite another genre from the cajoling of the professional politicians in caucuses. The difference between the two means of communication suggests the difficulty some politicians schooled in the techniques of closed politics have had in making the successful transition to open politics. Mayor Richard Daley, for example, a master of face to face negotiations behind closed doors, is unable to transfer his image of strength and vitality to the visual media. On television, he appears uneasy and portrays a weak, bland figure of ludicrous proportions, losing all believability. Yet because success in Chicago politics still depends to a great extent on closed politics, Daley is able to maintain his position.

Thus any professional politician who has not mastered the brand of communication needed in an open constituency, regardless of his personality type, would find it difficult to develop a meaningful representative relationship with his constituents. But a politician coming from a provincial background or possessing a provincial outlook on the world without this mastery would find it doubly difficult to make the transition to the larger constituency since many aspects of his new constituency might well escape his full understanding. Andrew Hacker,

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<sup>1</sup>Dahl, Who Governs? p. 256.

for example, suggested in his study on business elites and political elites that senators of a provincial outlook have difficulty in understanding the motives and outlooks of such individuals as metropolitan elites within their constituencies due primarily to the disparate images of society held by these individuals.<sup>1</sup> He pointed out that even though most legislators are actually sympathetic to the needs of business and sincerely wish to maintain the economic system as they understand it:

Problems arise, however, because the legislative image of the business world is cast largely in provincial terms. Most of the Senators have had little direct experience of metropolitan institutions and almost none have worked with the national corporations.<sup>2</sup>

The senator of a provincial background also had little appreciation of the national outlook of corporations since his only exposure to business had been with branch plants.<sup>3</sup> Hacker further implied that it is this ignorance of metropolitan economy that leads to "some of the most pronounced ambiguities in legislative behavior."<sup>4</sup> Hacker summed up the dilemma in these words:

While the lawmakers believe strongly in the institution of private property, their image of the economy is such that they are incapable of seeing the real conflicts between small and large businesses.<sup>5</sup>

And he added as a final note:

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<sup>1</sup>Hacker, "The Elected and the Anointed," p. 547.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 547-48.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 548.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

There is, in the corporate world, no small anxiety about the politics of democracy as they are expressed in legislation. This is not because the politics are democratic, but rather because they are focussed through a provincial lens rather than a metropolitan compass.<sup>1</sup>

This tendency on the part of the provincially oriented senator to misunderstand the urban elements of his constituency becomes serious when we contemplate that the nation is now over 70 per cent urban.<sup>2</sup>

We might say, then, that in order to succeed as a representative in a mass constituency, a senator should at least possess a knowledge of the mass media, have the skills needed to use it, as well as possess a total sensitivity to the needs of his constituents. Politicians who relied on the methods of communication formerly used in a closed system of politics would probably not succeed as "acting for" representatives in the mass constituency. Nor would the senator who possessed a provincial outlook on the polity succeed in representing a constituency plagued by diversity. Therefore, of the types of Senate influentials existent among the Senate membership before and after

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 548-49.

<sup>2</sup>The statewide constituency in Illinois had by 1920 already become 68 per cent urban, while in the nation as a whole 51.4 per cent of the population lived in cities. By 1950, 64 per cent of the entire nation was living in urban areas while by 1960 some 70 per cent of the nation was considered urban.

For Illinois data of 1920 see: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1935 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 6.

For U.S. data for 1950 and 1960 see: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 16.

1913, only the cosmopolitan influential and the cosmopol-local senator seemed suited to develop an adequate constituency relationship with the constituents. The local influential and the loco-cosmopolitan, on the other hand, seemed on the basis of these criteria most ill-suited to the task.

The Senator and His Exposure to the Political Affairs of the State

In addition to the necessity of having the proper perspective on problems within the state, a senator also must become aware of the most important issues troubling his constituents before he can begin to "act for" them. One way to become aware of the constituency and the issues most important to it is to work directly with the constituents. To observe whether the contact of popularly elected senators with constituency issues differed from the contact senators selected prior to 1913 had with constituency problems and issues, we might use the senator's pre-senatorial political experience as an index to assess early exposure to the state constituency and to state politics. Using categories developed by Joseph Schlesinger for his study of state governors,<sup>1</sup> such a comparison may be made. Included among these categories are the following:

1. State legislative offices, which include state houses and territorial legislatures;

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph A. Schlesinger, How They Became Governor: A Study of Comparative State Politics, 1870-1950 (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1957), p. 10.



2. Law enforcement offices, including attorneys, judicial positions at all levels, police officers, court clerks, reporters, and commissioners;

3. Statewide elective offices, including positions of governor, lieutenant governor, governor's councils, secretaries of state, state auditors, presidential electors, and offices in state constitutional conventions;

4. Federal legislative offices,<sup>1</sup> including positions of U.S. Representative, delegates to Congress from territories, and Confederate Congress delegates;

5. Administrative offices, including all appointive positions at all levels and all honorary positions;

6. Local elective offices, including mayor, mayor's councils, county officers of clerk, recorder, commissioner, school supervisor, and alderman;

7. No office, including all senators who had no public office experience prior to selection for the Senate.

Figure 8 connotes that the most common type of pre-senatorial political experience that senators engaged in prior to 1913 was state legislative experience, while after 1913 state legislative experience

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<sup>1</sup>This category is the only one not included in Schlesinger's listing. He had a similar category which he called "federal elective" that included offices within the "federal legislative" category in addition to governors who held offices as senators, U.S. presidents, or vice-presidents. Since none of the senators I dealt with held such offices, the "federal legislative" category seemed more conducive to my needs.




Fig. 8. --Pre-Senate political experience of all senators. (Source: Table 8 of this analysis.)  
 Note: The full office titles abbreviated in this figure may be found in Table 8.

declined in importance until it no longer dominated the recruitment structure, becoming little more important than any type of experience. This decline in the incidence of state legislative experience among the popularly elected senators is even more evident when one analyzes it by geographic regions.<sup>1</sup> Table 6 specified that in every region of the

TABLE 6  
PRE-SENATE STATE LEGISLATIVE OFFICE EXPERIENCE  
OF SENATORS WHO FIRST ENTERED THE SENATE  
BEFORE 1913 COMPARED TO THOSE  
WHO FIRST ENTERED THE  
SENATE AFTER 1913,  
BY REGION

Region <sup>a</sup>	Before 1913		After 1913	
	(Total N)	(Per cent) <sup>b</sup>	(Total N)	(Per cent) <sup>b</sup>
New England	51	75%	41	54%
Mid. Atlantic	32	38%	25	32%
Border	36	69%	33	33%
South	91	53%	64	48%
E. No. Central	42	43%	38	32%
W. No. Central	58	52%	48	38%
Mountain	53	62%	43	32%
Pacific	26	58%	21	24%
Total N	389		313	

<sup>a</sup>See Appendix II for an explanation of the states included in each region.

<sup>b</sup>Percentages in this case are not additive.

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix II for a map of the various regions of the country as they are divided for this study.

country the state legislature decreased in importance as an office sought by senators after 1913.

The effect of this decline in association with state legislatures has been to take away one important source of information concerning the state, possibly making it more difficult for a senator entering the Senate after 1913 to gain the same image of his state's problems and needs as that harbored by the senator elected from the state legislature. Having had state legislative experience--even biennially--for example, a prospective senator was able to deal face to face with state constituents and with citizen problems. As William J. Keefe suggested in commenting on the experience of a state legislator: "In the public's view of the job, legislators are elected to hear grievances and to listen to requests, and then to work for remedies or redress."<sup>1</sup> Through working with the thousands of proposals that a typical state legislator proposes and votes on each session, he is able to gain greater exposure to the totality of state issues and to get a real flavor of the state's problems and of the goals and desires of its inhabitants. The candidate as a state legislator is able to deal with such vital issues as social security, relief, taxes, unemployment, and education--all policy issues fundamental to the state citizens' welfare.

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<sup>1</sup>William J. Keefe, "The Functions and Powers of the State Legislature," in State Legislatures in American Politics, ed. by the American Assembly (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 41.

Senate candidates might also have gained similar exposure to the constituency, of course, in other state-related political positions. But as Figure 8 indicated, there was no increase in the number of senators who served in state elective offices and there was a similar decline among senators who served in law enforcement positions--many of which were state-oriented. The only area of political experience that seemed to increase after 1913 was in the administrative area at the local, state, and federal levels of government. The experience a senator gained in a state-related administrative position, wherein he was exposed to state government for extended periods, was equally as valuable to him in exposing him to state issues fundamental to the citizens' welfare as if he had been a state legislator.

This exposure to state affairs through experience in the state legislature or other state-related positions seems very important to a full understanding of the statewide constituency when one considers that once the senator is elected and takes up residence in Washington his contact with his state becomes very selective. His knowledge of his state, then, must come from letters he receives, from those who pay personal calls, from infrequent visits to his home state, from contact with major interest group representatives, and from information gleaned from the local opinion polls he reads and believes. As Warren Miller and Donald Stokes added in speaking of the similar situation faced by the congressman:

As a result, his sample of contacts, with a constituency of several hundred thousand people, is heavily biased: even

the contacts he apparently makes at random are likely to be with people who grossly overrepresent the degree of political information and interest in the constituency as a whole.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the senator selected prior to 1913 with experience gained working in the state legislature may well have been more cognizant of his state's goals and of the wishes and needs of its inhabitants when he entered the Senate than the popularly elected senator without this or similar pre-senatorial experience. Evidence of this may be seen if we observe the way in which senators from both periods voted in defense of their constituency. If we take four census characteristics of the state constituency and correlate them with a selection of domestic roll calls from Congresses before and after 1913, some sense of this may be seen.<sup>2</sup> If we find a high correlation between roll calls and census characteristics, we may presume that senators were voting on public policy in accordance with a broad range of state interests as represented in the census characteristics.<sup>3</sup> If, on the other hand, these correlations are low, we must presume that senators were less

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<sup>1</sup>Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influences in Congress," The American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), 54-55.

<sup>2</sup>For an explanation of the method used in this analysis, see Appendix III.

<sup>3</sup>Policies and actions in the "state's interest" indicate those policies and actions executed which would defend, maintain, or enhance basic social, economic, or political values of the state which are recognized by the inhabitants of the state to exist as a part of their life within the state. If, for example, a state is highly urban, we might presume that any action which would defend, maintain, or enhance the urban way of life would be in the "state's interests."

consistent in voting for issues of importance to the state's inhabitants. It may be observed in Table 7 that correlations were consistently lower

TABLE 7  
AVERAGE CORRELATIONS OF VOTES TABULATED ON SENATE  
DOMESTIC ROLL CALLS AND STATE  
CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS

State Census Characteristics <sup>a</sup>	Votes on domestic roll calls from senators selected BEFORE 1913 by state legislatures	Votes on domestic roll calls from senators selected AFTER 1913 by popular election
Per cent urban population	.282	.167
Per cent native population	.318	.127
Per cent rail employees	.160	.087
Per capita income	.070	.167
	N=39	N=40

Notes:

Domestic roll calls were selected on the basis of first session, final votes from the 49th, 54th, 59th, 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses.

Census characteristics were chosen on the basis of conformance to the subject matter of the roll calls.

The actual correlations were computed by the MESA 85 program developed by B. D. Wright, C. Bradford, and R. Strecker at the University of Chicago in 1965.

<sup>a</sup>Census data came from the U.S. Census figures for the years of 1890, 1910, and 1940 and included data on all states during these years.

after 1913 in every case but for per capita income. These results seem to suggest that senators who were popularly elected were actually less cognizant of their states' needs as represented in these roll calls than

were those senators selected by the state legislatures.<sup>1</sup> George R. Brown substantiated this assessment in 1922 and suggested that because of conditions within the polity popularly elected senators may well have been out of touch with their constituents. Observed Brown:

The party in the Senate was not of one mind for the reason that the people whom they represented were not of one mind. Opinion was in a formative stage, a fluid state, in the country, and Senators were but imperfectly in touch with public opinion, trying to sense it and to respond to it.<sup>2</sup>

And George H. Haynes in 1924 also indicated that senators might not have been acting in harmony with their states' needs:

The forecast that popular election will fill the Senate with men who will fight for "the things that people love" sets one pondering on Love's proverbial blindness.<sup>3</sup>

#### A Concluding Remark

Thus the popularly elected senator, unlike his predecessor, often found himself dealing with a constituency that his background and political experience probably ill-equipped him to handle. In addition, he found that the increase in constituency size had brought him no closer to the rank and file voter than his predecessor had been prior to

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<sup>1</sup> There are suggestions that the decline in the indicators in Table 7 also revealed shifts in the politics of urban states which occurred after 1896 as these industrial states changed party position from strongly pro-Republican to the New Deal posture of the 1930's. See Appendix VI for comparative correlations on New Deal roll calls.

<sup>2</sup> George R. Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), p. 276.

<sup>3</sup> George H. Haynes, "The Senate: New Style," The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1924, p. 261.



1913, although his predecessor was required to devote more attention to his formal constituency of state legislators than to the rank and file voter. Yet despite this division of interest, perhaps the senator selected before 1913 may have been better prepared to "act for" the voter at large than the senator elected after 1913 because of the nature of the political positions he held in which he dealt with statewide problems and voter needs. To be sure, conditions for representation had been altered by the Amendment. And it was necessary for the popularly elected senator to make compensating adjustments if he was to adequately perform his duties as a representative--but these were the same adjustments which seemed particularly difficult for many of the popularly elected senators to make. In light of these findings it is difficult to substantiate the hypothesis. This increase in constituency size once again had proved to be what Grant McConnell has suggested many times, i. e., that a change in size of such an important political unit as a constituency is itself a "central issue of politics."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 112.

## CHAPTER IV

### DIRECT ELECTION AND THE POLICY- MAKING FUNCTION

Congress has, over the years, come in for some stern criticism regarding its modern-day viability.<sup>1</sup> Samuel Huntington, to name only one critic of Congress, has suggested that in the twentieth century:

Insulation has made Congress unwilling to initiate laws. Dispersion has made Congress unable to aggregate individual bills into a coherent legislative program. Constituent service and administrative overseeing have eaten into the time and energy which congressmen give legislative matters. Congress is thus left in its legislative dilemma where the assertion of power is almost equivalent to the obstruction of action.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The following are examples of articles critical of Congress that have appeared during the last few years:

"Is Congress Obsolete?" The New Republic, January 5, 1963, p. 2;

Duane Lockard, "The Diminishing Role of Congress," The Nation, March 24, 1962, pp. 251-53;

Charles Rabb, "Obsolescence on the Hill," The Nation, March 31, 1969, pp. 390-92;

"'Uncreative,' 'Negative,' 'Smug'--Is this Today's U.S. Congress?" Newsweek, January 28, 1963, pp. 22-24.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in The Congress and America's Future, ed. by David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 26.

If indeed, Congress has ceased to perform a useful function<sup>1</sup> to either society or the general polity, as Huntington charged, then possibly Congress should be replaced with a more useful institution geared to present-day needs and should, itself, be allowed to wither into obscurity. But it is difficult to think of Congress as functionally dissipated. Although it no longer retains the same relationship to the other branches of government it once had,<sup>2</sup> and even though the Executive has now become its chief initiator of legislation,<sup>3</sup> Congress still possesses unique functions essential to government as we know it today. It still retains the power to administer and control the affairs of the Executive branch and still possesses the essential power to make public policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Function is here defined as any condition or state of affairs which is the result of the operation of the legislative structure.

<sup>2</sup> The House of Representatives ruled supreme during the second and third decades of the nineteenth century under the leadership of Henry Clay, and it was during these years that the congressional caucus determined who the president was to be. Likewise, the Senate maintained a position superior to the presidency at one time in its history. The height of the Senate's power came during the 1870's through the 1890's when such men as Nelson Aldrich and William B. Allison ruled the Senate.

<sup>3</sup> One congressman estimated that 80 per cent of the bills enacted into law originated in the Executive branch of government. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," p. 6.

President Eisenhower alone submitted in 1954 some sixty-five proposals to Congress in addition to the regular appropriations.

Richard E. Neustadt, "Planning the President's Program," The American Political Science Review, XLIX (December, 1955), 980.

### Important Congressional Functions

The administrative function--the first of these basic functions mentioned--originated from Congress's power to create Executive agencies and to authorize and appropriate funds for Executive programs,<sup>1</sup> and it owes a great deal of its recent impetus to the 1946 Reorganization Act which provided that congressional committees would have the power to "exercise continuous watchfulness" over the administration of the laws.<sup>2</sup> During the last two decades Congress has indeed strengthened its hold over the bureaucracy by diverting more effort to "watch-dog" activities. During the period from 1950 to 1962, in fact, congressional committees conducted more investigations than Congress had conducted throughout the entire nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

But it is the policy-making function--a function indigenous to most every legislative body--which is undoubtedly the most important power of Congress, and the one which will serve as the primary concern of this chapter. Without this power, Theodore J. Lowi suggested, Congress would "possess no power at all."<sup>4</sup> This function alone provides justification for Congress's continued existence.

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<sup>1</sup>Richard E. Neustadt, "Politicians and Bureaucrats," in The Congress and America's Future, ed. by David B. Truman, p. 103.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Congress, House, History of the United States House of Representatives, House Doc. 246, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1962, p. 166.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Theodore J. Lowi, ed., Legislative Politics U.S.A. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965), p. xvi.

Keeping the Legislative Function Viable

One way to keep the legislative function of the Senate viable is to attract to the Senate a membership of skilled law-makers. Skilled legislators can be trained either in the Senate itself or prior to entrance into the Senate through exposure to the legislative process in other legislative bodies. There are advantages, of course, in the newly elected senator learning the "ins" and "outs" of the policy-making process prior to his entrance into the Senate. The investment in time alone to orient a new senator is, of course, one reason. Without a previous acquaintance with policy-making, a senator must utilize some of his valuable time within the Senate to acquaint himself with the tactics, rules, strategies, and skills needed to become a productive legislator--a procedure which can only delay his development as an effective force within the institution. Each facet of policy-making must be learned firsthand and learned well in order for the senator to become an effective policy-maker. The very act of drafting legislation, for example, is a facet of law-making that, even though the senator does not entirely perform himself, must at least be well understood if he is to succeed in his role as a legislator. As Gross commented:

The ability to draft effectively is thus a vital element in the power picture. It has almost as much meaning for the legislative process as nominations have for election campaigns.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1953), p. 188.

The techniques of pushing a bill through committee, the ability to deal with lobbyists, and the techniques needed to guide the passage of legislation on the Senate floor can all be learned prior to entrance into the Senate from experience obtained in state legislatures or in the House of Representatives. Such an apprenticeship in a subsidiary legislative body, for example, has always been of value and has been considered essential to the Senate's party leadership.<sup>1</sup> Before 1913, for instance, all thirteen of the party leaders studied entered the Senate with prior training in other legislative bodies. Since 1913 six of the seven party leaders studied indicated that they had had previous training in other legislative bodies.

Prior experience in auxiliary legislative bodies not only prepares a senator for policy-making responsibilities, but it may also help to shape a new senator's thoughts, attitudes, and feelings concerning the importance of his legislative role in the Senate. Provided a senator has spent a number of terms in a state legislative office and has been an effective legislator on the state level, he is bound to consider his legislative role as one of the most important among his many roles as senator. It can also influence his choice as to what committee

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<sup>1</sup>Party leadership is defined here as including majority and minority leaders and whips as well as those individuals who were recognized by their party colleagues as "party leaders" before the formal positions of majority leader and whip were created. These recognized "party leaders" are referred to elsewhere in the paper as "personality" party leaders.

he wishes to serve on as well as the area in which he wishes to specialize. As Wahlke and Eulau suggested of legislative experience:

Thus legislative experience, by which we mean not just the quantity of time but rather the quality and character of experience, is an important variable shaping the legislative role.<sup>1</sup>

#### Direct Election and Preparation for Legislative Responsibilities

The importance of initial experience in other legislative bodies gives one cause to speculate as to the possible effect that the change in the mode of electing U. S. senators might have had on the policy-making function of the Senate. It is reasonable, for example, to presume that with the passage of this Amendment a senator's opportunity for prior legislative experiences would be somewhat hampered because he probably would not be as readily attracted to a state legislative career as he was before the Amendment's ratification. No longer, for instance, would the state legislature be that body of decision-makers who would determine which candidate would serve as senator. Now the appeal of the office of state legislator would hold no greater promise for advancement into the Senate than any other state or local office. And without these advantages to strengthen the appeal of this office, there would be increasingly less chance of encouraging the Senate candidate to gain exposure to the policy-making process prior to Senate election. The only alternatives to gaining legislative experience in

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<sup>1</sup>John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 22-23.

the state legislature which would be left to the candidate would be experience in either the city assemblies or the House of Representatives-- both of which may offer the candidate excellent exposure to policy-making but both of which have certain disadvantages. City assemblies in many cities, for instance, offer only limited exposure to the policy-making process compared to that which is offered in state legislatures;<sup>1</sup> and the House necessitates frequent expensive campaigns to maintain a seat<sup>2</sup> and discourages many new candidates from running for election because of an infrequent turnover rate.<sup>3</sup> Thus it would appear that

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<sup>1</sup>As an example of why city councils do not always offer adequate training in legislative training, Duane Lockard stated: "The city council, while suffering similar or more extensive restraints of this kind, [restraints to the legislative function which affected all legislatures] also had a great deal of its power removed and parceled out to commissions and special district governments of various kinds. Taxation, over which the state legislature in nearly all cases retains a general power, was often partially removed from the city council and its counterparts in counties or rural area governments and given to special district governments concerned with education and dozens of other functions."

Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1963), p. 324.

<sup>2</sup>A candidate for the state legislature, it has been estimated, probably pays on the average of \$9,000 for a state senate campaign, and \$6,500 for a state house campaign with leeway in the estimate for state differences.

Duane Lockard, "The State Legislator," in State Legislatures in American Politics, ed. by Alexander Heard (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 112.

A campaign for the House of Representatives, however, may cost as much as \$50,000.

V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 489.

<sup>3</sup>Charles S. Hynaman analyzed turnover in ten state legislatures during the period from 1925 to 1935 and estimated it to be 40 per cent



without the added incentive to run for a state legislative seat, the possibility of fewer senators gaining any exposure at all to the policy-making process prior to their election to the Senate seemed much greater after 1913. We might hypothesize, therefore, that:

HYP. III: As a result of the direct election of senators, fewer senators, on entrance to the Senate, were prepared to handle the legislative responsibilities of the Senate.

Political and Occupational Career Preparations of Senators Before and After 1913

To analyze this hypothesis, it would be well to compare career preparations and qualifications of those senators who entered the Senate before 1913 with those preparations of senators who entered after direct election to assess whether or not one group of senators was better qualified to assume the legislative tasks of the Senate than the other group. I shall concentrate on political and occupational career preparations that might have contributed to a senator's understanding of the legislative process. Three of these pre-senatorial experiences which seem to have important bearing on acquainting the senator with this process include experience in the state legislature and in federal

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in the lower houses and 20 per cent in the upper houses. Later estimates have put the figures for both houses in the 40 per cent range.

Lockard, "The State Legislator," p. 112.

Nelson Polsby showed an overall stability in the membership of the House during recent years and suggested that the mean term of service per incumbent had increased to over five years in the 1949-1963 period.

Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," The American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 147.

legislative positions as well as knowledge gained from the occupation of law.

As far as state legislative experience is concerned, this is one of the major ways senators could have gained exposure to the legislative process. Campaigning for this office is relatively inexpensive and turnover rates are fairly frequent as previously mentioned. If a candidate is able to spend several terms as a state legislator, it is possible to engage in all facets of the legislative process, including exposure to floor and committee work.<sup>1</sup> Because of this and other reasons the office of state legislator was most attractive to senators before the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, as Table 8 signifies. In fact, it was the most popular single office of any listed, as previously suggested in Chapter III. Some 53 per cent of the senators served their political apprenticeship in state legislatures prior to 1913 as compared with only 42 per cent who did so in law enforcement offices--the next most popular single office of political experience. After direct election, however, there was a decided decline in the popularity of the state legislative office as a preparatory office of experience. Senators no longer selected it any more frequently than any other office. In fact, only 39 per cent of the senators entering the

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<sup>1</sup> Several terms are thought necessary for a state legislator to gain full exposure to the legislative process since many state legislatures only meet biennially, which may be too infrequent for one-term legislators to experience total exposure.

TABLE 8

PRE-SENATE POLITICAL OFFICE EXPERIENCE OF SENATORS  
BEFORE AND AFTER DIRECT ELECTION  
(in per cent of those who held office)

Political offices:	Senators who first entered the Senate BEFORE 1913 (Per cent)	Senators who first entered the Senate AFTER 1913 (Per cent)
Administrative	27%	32%
Elective		
Statewide	36	34
Local	13	20
Legislative		
State	53	39
Federal	41	27
Law Enforcement	42	37
All Legislative <sup>a</sup>	73	56
	N=389	N=313

## Note:

Because of multiple offices held by senators, percentages are not additive.

<sup>a</sup>This category includes all senators who had experience in state or federal legislative offices but not in both.

Senate after 1913 had any state legislative experience at all. And if we rule out senators from such states as Maine and Mississippi, where the state legislature commanded an unusually powerful position in state politics that almost forced candidates to become state legislators to secure a satisfactory political future, and include only senators from

states where candidates had a more objective choice of preparatory experience, this figure would appear even lower.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise, the number of senators who sought positions in federal legislative positions also decreased significantly after 1913, as Table 8 denotes. The popularity of the House of Representatives, while never the highest before 1913, still remained an important office as far as equipping the senator with the legislative knowledge he needed to enter the Senate. But again, with the passage of this Amendment it, along with the state legislature, lost in popularity.

Of course the impact of the decrease of legislative experience on a senator's obtaining knowledge of the legislative process would have been partially neutralized had those senators who had entered the Senate after 1913 been somewhat familiar with the law and law-making by virtue of their occupational experience. A handful of senators may, of course, have belonged to organizations such as labor unions, farm organizations, and medical societies that provided regular legislative departments or legislative representatives to distribute information on congressional matters to its membership. But this service would offer no legislative experience itself and would give, at best, a rather

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<sup>1</sup>In Maine, for instance, the state legislature has the power to select the secretary of state, the auditor, the attorney general, the treasurer, and the governor's council. In Mississippi the state legislature has functioned long as a major outlet of political activity at the state level.

Joseph Schlesinger, How They Became Governor: A Study of Comparative State Politics, 1870-1950 (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1957), pp. 60, 66.

superficial knowledge of the law and law-making.<sup>1</sup> A more thorough knowledge of law-making, however, was available to senators who were trained to become lawyers. Senators who had received legal training were at least exposed to the intricacies of the law and some of its social repercussions and were taught occupational skills which they would be able to use to advantage in legislative law-making. Particularly, the skills of mediation and conciliation of conflicting interests would be of use to the new senator.<sup>2</sup> As Malcolm E. Jewell suggested of these skills:

The occupational role strains associated with a legislative status may be reduced among lawyers; they may be more receptive to the "bargainer" or "negotiator" role so commonly played in the American legislature.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, for example, has an active political program that includes the distribution of legislative bulletins and monthly newsletters that keep medical students, interns, and residents in touch with legislative developments. The AAPS is organized in such a way as to act as an emergency "rallying point" around which organized medicine might gather if and when "socialism" makes it necessary for the physicians to refuse their services to the public. In the past they have taken definite stands in support of the Bricker Amendment and the "liberty" Amendment. But upon observing their literature, it seems rather shallow and strictly propagandistic.

See AAPS, "Resolutions Adopted by the House of Delegates of the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons," (Chicago: AAPS, 1963), n.p.

<sup>2</sup>Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 33.

These particular skills, it might be added, might also be learned by the professional politicians as well.

<sup>3</sup>Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 110.

But in observing the numbers of senators after 1913 who had been trained in law but who were not necessarily practicing at the time of election, it appears, as Table 9 indicates, that fewer of these senators were elected to the Senate from popular constituencies than had

TABLE 9  
OCCUPATIONS FOLLOWED BY SENATORS PRIOR TO  
THEIR ENTRANCE INTO THE SENATE

Occupations	Senators who first entered the Senate BEFORE 1913 (Per cent)	Senators who first entered the Senate AFTER 1913 (Per cent)
Law or law related <sup>a</sup>	78%	65%
Other occupations	22	35
Totals	100%	100%
	N=389	N=313

<sup>a</sup>The "law or law related" category includes all those senators who had been practicing lawyers at the time of election in addition to those who had received legal training but were not necessarily practicing lawyers at the time of election.

been selected by the state legislatures. Prior to the ratification of the Amendment, 78 per cent of all of those senators in the sample had some legal background, but after direct election the number dropped to 65 per cent. While the decline was not dramatic, it nevertheless indicated that there was a decrease in numbers of an occupational group that for years had ruled supreme within the Senate and still today commands a majority of Senate members. Although legal experience can provide the individual

senator with the mechanics of policy-making and give him grounding in the legal process, it cannot guarantee his sensitivity to the needs of society. Consequently, whenever any one group so dominates an institution as do the lawyer-senators, the benefits of their occupational experience can actually be detrimental rather than of benefit to the policy-making function. Such dominance from a body of lawyer-senators with essentially the same social class background can exert a class and professional bias against the recognition of certain demands and diverse interests of the constituency that can prove restrictive and detrimental to meeting social needs through public policy.

#### The Amendment as a Contributor to this Decline

The question that must be asked after observing these trends is what was the major cause, if any, of this general disillusionment with positions in legislative assemblies in the recruitment of senators with legal backgrounds. Was it the direct result of the Seventeenth Amendment which specifically caused this change as it was presumed earlier? Although this is a difficult question to answer, as was previously alluded to in Chapter I, I shall nevertheless make an attempt to pinpoint the Amendment's importance regarding this matter. This may be accomplished through the use of one statistical method developed by Duncan MacRae, Jr., and based on a multiple regression analysis wherein the predicted number of political offices in which senators gained experience is compared to the actual number of political offices

in which they gained this experience.<sup>1</sup> Through the results of such a comparison, as detailed in Appendix IV, either a step function relationship or a linear function relationship should be visible among the variables. If the relationship between these predicted percentages of association and observed percentages of association indicate that a step function relationship does exist between the years just prior to and just after 1913, it would be supportive of the contention that the specific change in the election mode to popular election in 1913 was the probable major cause of the observed relationship. If no such step function exists, all that we can say of this change in the election of senators is that it either made no contribution at all to this decline, or that its contribution was supportive of other forces causing the change but not so important in and of itself. One word of caution is in order concerning the method before the results of the following figures are examined, i. e., only six cases produced the data for these examinations corresponding to the six Congresses studied. Nevertheless, the six cases will allow the researchers who might wish to follow up these results to gain some understanding of how such a statistical measure works in isolating causes and will allow the reader to gain a glimpse of the trends which might be expanded upon with the introduction of additional cases.

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<sup>1</sup>See Appendix IV for a more detailed explanation of this method.



Possible Causes for Disinterest in the State Legislative Office

Looking at the diagram in Figure 9, which was based on this method, indications are that there was an overall decrease in the popularity of the state legislature as an office of recruitment among the senators over time, but that this decline caused no noticeable step function between the congressional periods. On the basis of the six cases studied this would suggest, then, that the importance of the Amendment as the major cause of this trend was insignificant.<sup>1</sup> Thus we are encouraged by these results to look elsewhere for contributing causes of this decline. And the study of Joseph Schlesinger on the election of governors during the period from 1870-1950 may give us some suggestions as to the reasons for such a decline among Senate candidates.<sup>2</sup> Schlesinger suggested in his study that most likely the decline in the popularity of the state legislatures as an office of recruitment for governors during the period after 1900 was due principally to a reversion to nonpartisan politics after 1913 in such states as Nebraska and Minnesota, as well as the growth of urbanism throughout the U.S.<sup>3</sup> Such a change in politics to nonpartisan politics, Schlesinger contended, created dissimilarities in formerly similar gubernatorial and legislative electoral systems. This made it, then, extremely

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 13 in Appendix V for a detailed analysis of the findings of Figure 9.

<sup>2</sup>Schlesinger, How They Became Governor.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-51.




Fig. 9. --Step function analysis of senators with political experience in state legislatures, by Congress. (Source: Appendix V.)

difficult for partisan-oriented gubernatorial candidates to become enthusiastic over entering into a nonpartisan legislative office when there was no political future in advancing through a nonpartisan system of offices. The growth of cities, on the other hand, Schlesinger argued, created new divisions of interests and party cleavages along urban-rural lines. State legislatures became increasingly more dominated by legislators from rural areas.<sup>1</sup> This made it very difficult for governors to become interested in state legislative positions since it had to be their campaign strategy to try and soft-pedal rural-urban differences in their broader constituencies in order to win election--a feat they could not accomplish if they were expected to pander to rural interests.<sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly both of these developments--nonpartisan politics in some state legislatures and the growth of cities--also contributed to the declining popularity of the state legislature as an office of Senate recruitment. After all, senators, like governors, were partisan-oriented and, of necessity, were eager to develop their own party

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<sup>1</sup>As Mayor Ben West of Nashville was quoted as saying at a 1961 congressional subcommittee hearing: "In Tennessee, the pigs and cows in rural Moore County are better represented in the Legislature than the people of my City of Nashville."

W. Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 145.

In 1960 it was calculated that a voter in Moore County, Tennessee with a population of 2,340 had twenty-three times as much representation in the lower house of the state legislature as did a voter in Shelby County with a population of 312,345 including the city of Memphis.

Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>2</sup>Schlesinger, How They Became Governor, p. 51.

organizations outside of the state legislature, as I pointed out in Chapter II. Consequently, they would find it even more unrewarding than governors in states which had implemented nonpartisan political systems to run for election from those nonpartisan offices. In addition, with the development of the popular constituency, the Senate constituencies were now identical to the statewide gubernatorial constituencies. The Senate candidate could afford no less than the gubernatorial candidate to disaffect major concentrations of urban voters in favor of the rural constituents, particularly if he knew that in so doing it might lose him the election.<sup>1</sup> Thus these two developments undoubtedly contributed to dissuading senators from seeking out state legislative positions after 1913.

But the Amendment itself cannot be completely discounted as a contributing cause to this disassociation with the state legislature when we remember that the same reformers within the political system who made nonpartisanism a reality also were instrumental in passing this

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<sup>1</sup>No candidate can afford to completely write off any one section of his constituency. In Cook County, Illinois, for instance, a Republican candidate is not expected to win the county from the Democrats. But for him to entirely ignore the county might mean his defeat in the statewide tally. Although the county normally delivers a concentration of Democratic votes, it also produces a minor concentration of Republican votes that, when added to the vote totals from the rest of the state, often proves to be the marginal votes needed to win the election. In the first Illinois popular electoral contest for senator in 1914, for instance, Cook County delivered 159,372 votes in support of the losing Democratic candidate, Roger C. Sullivan, while 103,808 Republican votes from Cook County were added to Lawrence V. Sherman's total to secure his victory.

Illinois, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1915 (Danville, Ill.: Illinois Printing Co., 1916), p. 694.

Amendment. While not acting as the major cause for decline, it surely discouraged a number of those senators from entering the state legislature who felt that this specific office would serve as a particularly important office in the Senate recruitment structure. After all, the state legislature, prior to direct election, had served not only as the constituency for the senators but as a very important means whereby a candidate could become an important voice on the national political scene. Riker has suggested, in fact, that it was through these same state legislatures that the state legislators had "pushed themselves into national affairs."<sup>1</sup> George H. Haynes, in talking of the state legislature and its relationship to this Amendment, stated:

From the state legislator, also, the popular choice of senators would remove a frequent source of temptation to look upon state politics merely as a pawn in the larger game, if to do nothing more palpably discreditable.<sup>2</sup>

And when this channel of recruitment was discouraged by the Amendment, many senators of this mind looked elsewhere for offices which would compensate for the loss of the state legislature.

#### Possible Causes for Disinterest in the Federal Legislative Office

As far as the decline in interest in "federal legislative" positions is concerned, the above multiple regression analysis reveals in

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<sup>1</sup>William H. Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism," The American Political Science Review, XLIX (June, 1955), 455.

<sup>2</sup>George H. Haynes, Representation in State Legislatures (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1900), p. 105.

Figure 10 that, again, no positive step function exists. These results indicate, as well, that when considered alone, the Seventeenth Amendment had no major effect in discouraging Senate candidates from seeking out congressional seats prior to their election.<sup>1</sup> The reason fewer senators entered the House of Representatives after 1913 probably can be blamed on the increased satisfaction of House members in their own institution. Polsby pointed out that the move toward institutionalizing the House during the twentieth century had increased its value among its members, enabling institutional leaders to gain a greater loyalty from the general membership.<sup>2</sup> This increased satisfaction among House membership has caused a significant decline in the rate of turnover among House members with the average incumbent member serving over five years.<sup>3</sup> This, of course, has prevented the frequent entrance of new freshmen into the body and has made it difficult for the Senate candidate to gain entrance to the House in order to obtain exposure to the legislative process.

#### Possible Causes for Decline among Lawyer Candidates

As to the reasons why we should have had fewer senators with legal training attracted to the Senate after 1913, three seem important.

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<sup>1</sup>See Table 14 in Appendix V for a detailed analysis of the findings of Figure 10.

<sup>2</sup>Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of Representatives," p. 168.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

KEY

- x observed values
- o predicted values




Fig. 10. --Step function analysis of senators with political experience in federal legislative offices, by Congress. (Source: Appendix V.)

One probable reason is related to the decrease in the popularity of the law enforcement office as an office of Senate recruitment after direct election. Table 8 specifies that this drop in popularity, while not great, was a decline from former years. Since lawyers have always monopolized the law enforcement offices because of the overlap in interests and skills required for the office,<sup>1</sup> a decline in these positions would probably mean a decline in the number of lawyer-candidates. Consequently, with the increase in state and local oriented political offices, as Table 8 discloses, where law was not so crucial a prerequisite, more candidates outside of the legal profession slowly replaced lawyer-senators within the Senate.

A second reason that may have produced fewer senators with legal experience after 1913 is directly related to the difference in the occupational make-up of both the popular and state legislative constituencies themselves. The state legislatures have always had a high concentration of lawyers within their ranks. In one count made of the Forty-fourth General Assembly in Illinois in 1905, for example, 45 per

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<sup>1</sup>A further analysis of lawyer-senators revealed what a great monopoly they had over law enforcement offices. Fifty-one per cent of the 305 senators with legal backgrounds had political experience in law enforcement offices before 1913, while 53 per cent of the 204 senators with legal backgrounds had experience in law enforcement offices after 1913. This compared to 7 per cent of the 84 senators without legal backgrounds who had had law enforcement experience before 1913, and 6 per cent of the 109 senators without legal backgrounds who had had law enforcement experience after 1913.



cent of the senate and 33 per cent of the house were lawyers.<sup>1</sup> In a number of comprehensive multistate studies of state legislatures that have been conducted since 1913, similar figures were revealed. In one study, for instance, 28 per cent of 12,689 state legislators serving in thirteen lower chambers and twelve senates between 1925 and 1935 were lawyers,<sup>2</sup> while in another study 22 per cent of the members of the forty-eight state legislatures in 1949 were lawyers.<sup>3</sup> These concentrations, of course, vary with individual states. In Illinois, between the years of 1937 and 1957, 27 per cent of the house and 42 per cent of the senate were lawyers, while in Missouri during these same years 23 per cent of the house and 49 per cent of the senate were lawyers.<sup>4</sup> Lawyers in the entire state of Missouri in 1950, however, made up only two-fifths of 1 per cent of the labor force in the state, while in Illinois lawyers composed one-half of 1 per cent of the labor force.<sup>5</sup> Thus having a greater immediate concentration of lawyers in the state legislature from which to draw for possible Senate candidates and having a

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<sup>1</sup>Illinois, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1905 (Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Journal Co., 1905), pp. 254-305.

<sup>2</sup>C. S. Hyneman, "Who Makes Our Laws?" Political Science Quarterly, LV (December, 1940), 557.

<sup>3</sup>Belle Zeller, ed., American State Legislatures (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954), p. 71.

<sup>4</sup>David R. Derge, "The Lawyers as Decision-Makers in the American State Legislature," The Journal of Politics, XXI (August, 1959), 410.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

high concentration of lawyers seated as decision-makers within these legislatures, this may have biased the selection of senators prior to 1913 in favor of the lawyer-candidate. In the statewide popular electorate, however, lawyers, even though attracted to politics more frequently than most professionals, were less concentrated and probably carried less weight as decision-makers in the popular constituencies compared to the state legislatures.

One final reason that candidates with backgrounds other than law may have been attracted to the Senate after 1913 can be attributed to the skills required of politicians to win election in a popular constituency. If you change the political arena for combat, you often make it necessary to change the weapons needed for combat. Candidates, in order to win the popular vote, needed to develop the political skills necessary to influence the voter at large, as I suggested in Chapter III. The greatest increases in nonlegal occupations after 1913, as one observes in Table 10, came from those senators with careers in publishing, journalism, professional politics, and educational administration--occupations which appear most visible to the general electorate and the first three of which might be considered occupations of opinion manipulation.<sup>1</sup> The candidate trained in one of these professions learns the persuasive skills which might be best adapted to open

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<sup>1</sup>By opinion manipulating I have reference to those career specialists in occupations wherein the individuals are working directly with the public and in their specific jobs could be considered opinion leaders, setting standards for public opinion.

TABLE 10

PRE-SENATE NONLEGAL OCCUPATIONS OF THOSE SENATORS  
WHO FIRST ENTERED THE SENATE BEFORE 1913  
COMPARED TO THOSE SENATORS WHO  
FIRST ENTERED THE SENATE  
AFTER 1913

Before 1913		After 1913	Before 1913		After 1913
Occupations	(Total N)	(Total N)	Occupations	(Total N)	(Total N)
<u>Profess.</u>			<u>Operatives</u>		
Actor . .		3	<u>Extractive</u>		
Dentistry . .		3	Industry . .		3
Editors,			Manufactur-		
Publishers,	6	22	ing	8	6
and Opinion			Mining	4	1
Engineer . .		4	Railroad	3	3
Education	1	6	Utilities . .		3
Gen. Science . .		1	<u>Laborers</u>		
Medicine	4	2	Lumber	2	2
Ministry	1	. .	<u>Farming</u>		
Politician <sup>a</sup> . .		3	Farmers	11	13
<u>Managers</u>			Plantation	1	2
Banking	3	2	Stock	3	9
Civil Service	3	. .	<u>Pvt.</u>		
Gen. Business <sup>b</sup>	24	21	Household		
Insurance	2	2	Housewife . .		2
Military	3	1			
<u>Craftsmen</u>					
General					
Craftsmen	1	. .			
Printer . .		2			

Note:

Total N: (Before 1913) N = 80; (After 1913) N = 117.

<sup>a</sup>Those senators included in this category listed no other occupation but politics.

<sup>b</sup>Those senators included in this category listed no specific business endeavor.

constituencies. In addition to these nonlegal occupations represented in Congress after 1913, businessmen made up the greatest number of the nonlegal careers represented in the Senate. They also seemed well adapted to dealing in an open constituency. Although many of these businessmen were not opinion manipulators in the strictest sense of the word, they all were capable of dealing with the public, and those in the area of sales were probably capable of "manipulating" the consumers' will. This skill would give them the persuasive competence needed to win votes from the popular constituency.

#### The Amendment and Early Exposure to the Policy-making Process

Pre-senatorial exposure to the policy-making process thus sustained two important setbacks after 1913. First of all, only slightly more than half of all the popularly elected senators had sought positions at the state or federal level which could give them legislative experience prior to their entrance into the Senate. This was a decided decline from the nearly three-quarters of those who had experienced such exposure prior to direct election. A second setback concerned the fact that by virtue of the occupations represented in the Senate more senators entering the Senate after 1913 were ignorant of the workings of the law that they would be required to legislate. This, however, may not have been as detrimental to policy-making as the first since, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the presence of senators from a variety of occupations might also prove beneficial to the substance of public policy

in bringing fresh solutions to perplexing social problems. The Amendment itself seemed to indirectly contribute to these circumstances, both in discouraging those senators from entering a state legislative career and in encouraging the inclusion within the Senate of an increased number of senators from nonlegal occupations selected from the larger constituency.

One effect of this loss in popularity suffered by legislative political careers was to encourage popularly elected senators to look elsewhere for pre-senatorial political experience. With government at all levels becoming increasingly bureaucratized during the twentieth century,<sup>1</sup> the chances of a senator gaining political experience in an elective or appointive administrative position seemed intuitively better after direct election than before. And indeed senators with elective and appointive administrative experience--including all those senators who had political experience on commissions, on boards at all levels of government, and any other bureaucratic position--did increase after 1913. Of the 313 senators analyzed after 1913, 56 per cent had had administrative experience compared to 49 per cent of the 398 senators studied prior to 1913. And although this increase was not startling,

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<sup>1</sup>As an example of how government has become bureaucratized in the last years, Morton Grodzins suggested that in the 1950's there were, in addition to the expansive federal government and 50 state governments, approximately 18,000 general purpose municipalities, slightly fewer general purpose townships, more than 3,000 counties, and innumerable special purpose governments. He also estimated that there were some 92,000 tax-levying governments in the country.

Morton Grodzins, The American System, ed. by Daniel J. Elazar (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), p. 3.

it was indicative of the general direction in which popularly elected senators were moving for their pre-senatorial political experiences. This turn of events after 1913 made the chances of a senator entering the Senate with administrative experience equally as good as having him enter the Senate with legislative experience, as can be seen if we look again at Table 8.

As a consequence, the Senate found itself with an increased number of new administrator-senators who, from a standpoint of prior knowledge of Senate functions, were probably more adequately equipped to understand the complexities of bureaucratic politics and able to immediately adjust to the administrative assignments which had steadily increased in frequency and importance since the turn of the century.<sup>1</sup> This was likely advantageous as far as administrating the affairs of the Senate was concerned. But it also had its probable drawbacks. This new-found familiarity of freshmen senators with administrative politics at the same time undoubtedly made it increasingly difficult to tackle questions of general public policy. The Amendment alone had not been responsible for this turn of events but all reform forces working together that had caused the decrease in the popularity of legislative offices. Thus we cannot prove the hypothesis true as it stands. Probably the most we could say for the Amendment itself would be that when it was separated and isolated from the other causes, it was not responsible for

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<sup>1</sup>Huntington, "Congressional Response to the Twentieth Century," p. 24.

much of the decline in the popularity of legislative positions and the increase in the popularity of administrative positions. But in conjunction with other causes, on the other hand, the act of expanding the constituencies gave real impetus to these changes.

## CHAPTER V

### DIRECT ELECTION AND THE RECRUITMENT STRUCTURE

The means of advancement from office to office is an important characteristic of any political system. . . . Given an abundance of elective offices in a constitutional framework of federalism and the separation of powers, many paths are open to the politically ambitious.<sup>1</sup>

To know the system of recruitment peculiar to a particular office is to know the means for election to that office. Although most high offices have a discernible recruitment structure,<sup>2</sup> few are strictly ordered. Most recruitment structures fit the description alluded to by Lasswell who stated:

In American politics the escalator to the top is not a regimented, orderly lift, but a tangle of ladders, ropes, and runways that attract people from other activities at various stages of the process, and lead others to a dead end or a blind drop.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph A. Schlesinger, How They Became Governor: A Study of Comparative State Politics, 1870-1950 (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1957), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>A recruitment structure will be defined as a series of political offices involving both least important and most important offices which when arranged in order from first office to end office tend to lead toward advancement to the highest office--in this case, the Senate.

<sup>3</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 303.



Nevertheless, most political positions show enough consistency in the prerequisite experience expected of a candidate for that office to allow the researcher to point to certain political offices as more important for advancement than other offices. Only a certain few offices, for example, could be considered important in the recruitment structure of the presidency. And the county clerk's office, Schlesinger pointed out, is not one of these:

No legal prescription keeps the county clerk from the presidency. Nevertheless, the major national conventions have yet to nominate a county clerk for the highest national office.<sup>1</sup>

Not only are some offices of more importance in the recruitment structure of a high office than others, but an office can be of more or less significance within a particular recruitment structure depending on its placement. Most particularly the first political office in the career of a senator is of interest since this is the office that opens up the Senate recruitment channels to a candidate and allows him to advance toward election to the Senate. Of more importance, of course, is the last office prior to Senate election, or the end office, since this is the office from which the senator is directly elected. First offices and end offices are rarely the same in a recruitment structure. The county clerk's office, for example, while it could not be considered a significant end office in the recruitment structure of the presidency might be important as a first office provided that the candidate prior to

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<sup>1</sup>Schlesinger, How They Became Governor, p. 9.

his election to the presidency was able to advance to a more politically important end office. There are candidates, of course, who have successfully won nomination to high office with little prior experience, but these candidates are the exception and will not be considered in this chapter except in passing.

#### Direct Election and Senate Recruitment

I would suppose that the change in election modes brought on as a result of the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment might have altered the Senate recruitment structure somewhat through decreasing the importance of the state legislature in the eyes of many Senate candidates. Decreasing the importance of this office would probably have the effect of increasing the relative importance of other offices within the recruitment structure. I would also expect if other offices within the Senate recruitment structure became more important this would increase the number of opportunities for election to the Senate, making entrance into the Senate increasingly easier for more candidates. I would further expect that the party mavericks and candidates without party sanction but with an ability to deal with and influence voters might find it easier to win election to the Senate within the new popular constituencies. In summation it might be hypothesized that:

HYP. IV: As a result of the direct election of senators, the office of senator became more accessible to potential candidates through a less rigid recruitment structure.

The Senate Recruitment Structure--Before and After 1913

To determine whether it was easier for a candidate to enter the Senate after direct election, we must first observe whether or not there were established Senate recruitment structures existing before and after 1913. Once established, then a comparison of their similarities and differences could be made based on the categories used in Chapter III and developed by Joseph Schlesinger.<sup>1</sup> These comparisons would then enable us to determine whether there were indications of increased simplification of recruitment after the Amendment was ratified.

Observing the prerequisite offices of senators who entered the Senate prior to 1913, Figure 11 signifies that at least half of all the Senate candidates had experience in the state legislature prior to their entrance into the Senate. It is not surprising that this would be the most popular office since a man interested in senatorial appointment would probably deem it beneficial and useful to work closely with that electorate which would later select him as senator. Thus he would have considerable incentive to gain state legislative experience--experience which would allow him to make political contacts necessary for appointment. The only surprise is that there were not more senators who first entered the state legislature in preparation for Senate election. From this same figure, moreover, we also notice a good number of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 10.




Fig. 11.--Pre-Senate political office experience of all senators who first entered the Senate before 1913 compared to senators who first entered the Senate after 1913. (Source: Table 8 of this analysis.)

Note: The full office titles abbreviated in this figure may be found in Table 8.

senators had experience in law enforcement offices, and that at least 40 per cent of the senators had served previously in federal legislative positions--offices which offered a prospective Senate hopeful a solid legislative background prior to his election to the Senate and one which, intuitively, could be considered an important end office in the Senate recruitment structure. The preceding percentages of association with these offices were all high enough to establish them as important offices within a recruitment structure of the Senate before 1913.<sup>1</sup>

After direct election, however, the recruitment structure seemed to take on a different appearance. Because of the effect of this Amendment and other Progressive reforms mentioned in Chapter IV, the importance of the state legislature as a recruitment channel decreased significantly, as Figure 11 indicates, making no one office in the recruitment structure appear much more important than any other office after 1913. With the decrease in interest in the state legislature, each elected and appointive local, state and federal office took on added importance, becoming a potential stepping stone into the Senate with no one specific office of general experience considered either essential or detrimental to a candidate holding the office of senator.

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph Schlesinger suggested in his study that when 40 per cent of the senators selected one office this indicated a rather strong pattern of selection. He also suggested that 30 per cent was a minimum figure of association. These seem like reasonable percentages and so I shall use them as well.

Ibid., p. 16.

And this leveling effect that the Amendment had on recruitment in general was also reflected among important first offices in the recruitment structure. Before direct election the state legislative and law enforcement offices had dominated the first offices of the Senate recruitment structure, as shown in Figure 12. Since 1913, however, no office reached the 30 per cent standard that had been set as a minimum for considering the office as important. Rather, there was a leveling out of the structure wherein administrative and local elective offices increased their importance, becoming almost as popular a first office as state legislative and law enforcement offices. This equalizing effect among first offices that the Amendment had caused was not restricted to any particular region of the country, but it occurred throughout the nation except for the Middle Atlantic region. Figure 13 shows one of these regions--the Border region--as a typical example of the leveling effect that this Amendment had on the recruitment structure.

#### The Leveling of the Recruitment Structure and Representation

What this equality among recruitment offices meant in terms of accessibility to the Senate was important to prospective candidates. It meant, for one thing, that popularly elected senators could begin their political apprenticeship from a variety of different political offices. No one office would be necessarily more beneficial to the candidate than another one to begin his political career since each




Fig. 12.--First political offices of senators who first entered the Senate before 1913 compared to senators who first entered the Senate after 1913.

Note: The full office titles abbreviated in this figure may be found in Table 8.




Fig. 13. --First political offices of senators who first entered the Senate before 1913 compared to senators who first entered the Senate after 1913 in the Border region of the country.

Notes: See Appendix II for the location of the Border region.

The full office titles abbreviated in this figure may be found in Table 8.



appeared to lead toward potential Senate candidacy. To the Senate as a body this meant that candidates after 1913 would be entering the Senate with a variety of political experiences that could prove of importance to the functioning of the Senate, as I pointed out in Chapter IV. In addition to the increased heterogeneity of political experiences that would be represented in the Senate as a result of popular election, the leveling of the recruitment structure also implied that candidates from different social and occupational backgrounds might also, for the first time, gain entrance to the Senate. Before direct election, for example, some candidates from social classes prevalent in urban areas had found it very difficult to be elected by the rurally overrepresented state legislatures.<sup>1</sup> But with the ratification of the Amendment candidates from the city could avert confrontations with the state legislatures by entering the Senate by means of local political offices in city government or other offices where election could be won more easily. It was not until after the Amendment was ratified, in fact, that urban-based senators from lower-class families<sup>2</sup> were able to gain any representation

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<sup>1</sup>Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 88.

<sup>2</sup>The occupation of the senator's father was used as an index to social class in this chapter since it is one of the most reliable indicators of social class.

See Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), p. 19.

in the Senate at all.<sup>1</sup> Of 321 senators studied before 1913, none had come from laborer families, but after 1913 4 per cent of 249 senators studied claimed such roots. And this changing circumstance did not seem to be precipitated by changes in the labor force.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary,

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<sup>1</sup>"Representation" in this chapter is used in a different sense from representation which was defined in Chapter III. Representation here is what Pitkin referred to as "descriptive representation," and not "action-oriented" representation as was used in Chapter III. Descriptive representation is concerned only that an assembly is the mirror and image of the characteristics of the particular electorate. Although this definition is limiting and not as useful when making a thorough investigation of a representative relationship as was done in Chapter III, descriptive representation is nevertheless useful in this case as an index of change, and as an index to observe the movement of class and occupation from the electorate into the Senate.

For a further explanation of descriptive representation see Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 61.

<sup>2</sup>Prior to 1913 there were some 16 per cent of the labor force (N = 38, 109, 000) that fell under the classification of Laborer; after 1913, 12 per cent of the labor force (N = 108, 500, 000) could be considered Laborers.

Figures for the labor force were calculated on the bases of the labor force from six Censuses. Before 1913 the Censuses of 1860, 1870, and 1880 were used, while after 1913 the Censuses from 1900, 1910, and 1920 were used. This selection was based on the approximate years that the senators' fathers would have been out in the labor market, using 30 years before each Congress studied as an approximation.

Census data came from the following publications:

U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of the Census, Population of the United States, 1860 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), pp. 656-79;

U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of the Census, A Compendium of the 9th Census (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), pp. 604-15;

U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1880, Vol. I: Characteristics of the Population, pp. 744-50;

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957

such inroads made after 1913 from such previously ignored social classes may well have been possible only after the Amendment had provided these alternate channels to the Senate under popular election. Allowing an increased number of senators from social classes formerly unrepresented into the Senate could have a desirable effect in establishing conditions favorable to improved representative relationships between these senators and constituents from these same social classes. Likewise, once these multiple routes became established, accessibility to the Senate seemed to have also increased among senators from occupations formerly unrepresented. Although law remained the most popular occupation of the senators seated after 1913, more senators with occupations outside law began to be elected by popular constituencies.<sup>1</sup> Exactly 35 per cent of the 313 senators studied after 1913 were in occupations other than law compared to 22 per cent of the 389 senators studied before 1913. And this increase appeared in all sections of the country except for the Border region, as Table 11 suggests. A check of any abrupt changes in the labor force during these years did not lead me to believe that these alterations were the result of any

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(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 74.

Individual job titles fitting the classification of Laborer and other classifications which will be used in this chapter may be found in Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 75-78.

<sup>1</sup>See Chapter IV for an explanation of additional reasons for the decrease in the number of lawyer-senators entering the Senate after 1913.

TABLE 11

PRE-SENATE NONLEGAL OCCUPATIONS OF THOSE SENATORS  
WHO FIRST ENTERED THE SENATE BEFORE 1913  
COMPARED TO THOSE SENATORS WHO  
FIRST ENTERED THE SENATE  
AFTER 1913, BY REGION

Region <sup>a</sup>	Before 1913		After 1913	
	(Total N)	(Per cent) <sup>b</sup>	(Total N)	(Per cent) <sup>b</sup>
New England	51	31%	41	44%
Mid. Atlantic	32	44%	25	56%
Border	36	14%	33	6%
South	91	11%	64	19%
E. No. Central	42	14%	38	42%
W. No. Central	58	16%	48	48%
Mountain	53	34%	43	44%
Pacific	26	23%	21	24%
Total N	389		313	

<sup>a</sup>See Appendix II for an explanation of the states included in each region.

<sup>b</sup>Percentages in this case are not additive.

changes therein.<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, it seems that once the Amendment opened up the recruitment structure enabling political positions such as

<sup>1</sup>Based on the Census data from 1900 and 1910, Professionals made up about 5 per cent of the labor force (N = 66,321,000) before 1913, while after 1913 they made up about 7 per cent of the labor force (N = 201,633,000), based on Census data for the years 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1950. Laborers decreased from 12 per cent to 9 per cent, while

local elective and administrative positions to become plausible alternative first offices in the recruitment structure along with the state legislative and law enforcement offices, senators from diverse occupational experiences were attracted to the structure, as I previously suggested in Chapter IV.<sup>1</sup>

This equalization of offices in the recruitment structure may also have had an indirect effect on Senate institutional leadership as well.<sup>2</sup> Since leadership was selected directly from the rank and file,

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Craftsmen increased from 11 per cent to 13 per cent, and those in the Operative occupations increased from 14 per cent to 18 per cent of the labor force after 1913.

The preceding Census years were selected because they were relatively near the dates of the Congresses studied and because they were accessible in Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 74.

<sup>1</sup>With law enforcement offices as one of the two popular first offices prior to 1913, it provided the legally trained candidate with an almost ready-made office for easy access into the Senate recruitment structure since the law enforcement positions were virtually closed to the nonlegally trained.

See Chapter IV for a further elaboration of how lawyer-candidates monopolized this office.

<sup>2</sup>Institutional leadership includes all senators who occupied positions of chairmen and ranking minority members on the six most powerful Senate committees, and all who were chosen to be presidents pro tempore, but does not include the party leadership which includes the majority and minority leaders and whips. The committees from which the institutional leadership were chosen included the Armed Services Committee--which in earlier times had included both the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees--the Committees on Appropriations, Finance, Foreign Relations, the Judiciary, and the Commerce Committee. The committee listing was compiled from Ripley's list of the six most sought after committees which senators most preferred as assignments.

Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 56.

any change in social class and occupation of the rank and file members was bound to eventually be reflected in the leadership structure. Once senators from the lower classes such as the sons of laborers and sons of craftsmen were able to gain representation within the Senate membership, they were also able to gain position among the leadership. Before 1913 the eighty-two institutional leaders analyzed included no senator from laborer families and only 2 per cent of the senators from families of craftsmen. After 1913, however, 3 per cent of the 33 senators studied came from laborer families and 9 per cent of the senators within the institutional leadership came from craftsman families, which far exceeded what one would have expected based on the numbers of craftsmen within the rank and file.<sup>1</sup> Table 12 indicates, in addition, that senators from nonlegal occupations, once they were able to win seats in the Senate, were also able to rise to positions of leadership after direct election, achieving representation beyond the expected level.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>We may observe how "overrepresented" craftsmen were through the use of Matthew's "index of overrepresentation." He defines this index as:

$$\frac{\% \text{ of senators possessing attribute "A"}}{\% \text{ of population possessing attribute "A"}}$$

An index smaller than 1.0 indicates that the attribute is underrepresented, while an index of 1.0 suggests perfect representation and one of 2.0 indicates twice the expected proportion.

The index of overrepresentation for institutional leaders from the families of craftsmen was 4.5 after 1913, while the index for institutional leaders from the families of laborers was 1.0.

<sup>2</sup>This assessment, again, is based on the results of the index of overrepresentation indicated in Table 12.

TABLE 12

PRE-SENATE OCCUPATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL  
LEADERSHIP OF THE SENATE

Occupations	Senators who first entered the Senate BEFORE 1913 (Per cent)	Index of overrepresentation	Senators who first entered the Senate AFTER 1913 (Per cent)	Index of overrepresentation
Law or law related <sup>a</sup>	83%	1.10	53%	.81
Other occupations <sup>b</sup>	17%	.77	47%	1.34
Totals	100%		100%	
	N=93		N=34	

<sup>a</sup>The "law or law related" category includes all those senators who had been practicing lawyers at the time of election in addition to those who had received legal training but were not necessarily practicing lawyers at the time of election.

<sup>b</sup>Other occupations specified include: editors and publishers, farmers, stockmen, medical personnel, business, politics, education, the military, and civil service.

Thus there is reason to believe that opening up the recruitment structure to a greater variety of potential candidates from diverse backgrounds made it possible for senators from formerly ignored social classes and occupations to at least gain some semblance of accessibility to both the rank and file as well as leadership positions within the Senate.<sup>1</sup> And this is an important consideration when one stops to

<sup>1</sup>The Senate still remained, after 1913, essentially an upper middle class institution with over 53 per cent of the 249 senators

think that even a slight variation in the social classes or occupations represented within the Senate can be of importance to both the Senate and individual constituencies. The absence in Congress of representatives from various sectors of the polity, for instance, is important to the constituency since it may give certain individuals the idea that:

. . . their point of view is not being represented in Congress, and thus make it more difficult for Congress to gain support and legitimacy for its decisions. There is some evidence that those sectors of the population underrepresented in a literal sense--especially the poor and the non-white--feel a certain degree of alienation from the political system because of this fact.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, we know that within a legislative chamber a legislator's attitude and judgment on certain matters may also be altered by biases he has engendered because of his social class. Mattei Dogan in his study of French Deputies concluded:

Two men, one born in a bourgeois family, the other in a modest family, are likely to espouse different political views--if not diametrically opposed ones--even if they follow the same profession and attain similar rank in it.<sup>2</sup>

And Donald Matthews concluded much the same thing concerning our more fluid society: ". . . even in a relatively fluid class system an

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coming from white collar families and another 33 per cent coming from farming families.

Data for this assessment came from the 69th, 74th, and 79th Congresses.

<sup>1</sup> Stephen V. Monsma, American Politics: A Systems Approach (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in Class Society: French Deputies, 1870-1958" in Political Decision-Makers, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 72.



individual's social status makes a great difference in how he behaves, what he thinks, and what his opportunities are."<sup>1</sup>

The Leveling of the Recruitment Structure and Free Access to the Senate

But we cannot presume that the effects of this Amendment have automatically increased accessibility to the Senate merely because the leveling of the recruitment structure seemed to have increased the participation of certain social classes and occupational groups since 1913. To begin with, such a line of reasoning would totally ignore the importance of the election process. Even though senators from formerly unrepresented facets of the polity had been able to win election in certain cases, they had not done so haphazardly. These senators, along with all other candidates for office, had to follow certain recruitment conventions and skirt certain obstacles to election before the Senate seat could be theirs. Many of the same barriers to free access to Senate election existent before direct election remained after 1913, and they had to be reckoned with by each candidate. One of the most important barriers that remained to entering the Senate, of course, was the necessity of a candidate having some pre-senatorial political experience. It had been predicted by William Jennings Bryan that once the Amendment was ratified:

We will find that instead of having the Senate filled up with representatives of predatory wealth who use their power to oppose the things that people love--we will find that the

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<sup>1</sup>Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, p. 9.

honor of a position in that body will be reserved as a prize with which to reward those who have proved themselves capable of the discharge of public duties and men to be trusted with the people's interests.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately for Mr. Bryan, he would find, were he still alive today, that reward for diligent service was offered only if that service was in the name of party. The candidates least likely to achieve a Senate seat through election in the popular constituency were the same types of candidates who had been least likely to achieve election from the state legislatures, i. e., those candidates who had no previous political experience. Nominations to such an important office as the Senate remained a prize that party leadership retained for only the most loyal of party members. Thus the Senate candidate had to prove his loyalty to party through extended political service as often after the Amendment was ratified as he had to preceding the Amendment. The nonparty "amateur" politician was virtually nonelectable to high office regardless of the change in the modes of election. Only 7 per cent of the 389 senators studied before 1913 and but 9 per cent of the 313 popularly elected senators had been able to succeed in gaining a Senate seat without party experience, but a number of these senators, of course, had been appointees who were selected to fill unexpired terms of other senators.<sup>2</sup> Although this Amendment failed to weaken the hold that

<sup>1</sup>William Jennings Bryan quoted in George H. Haynes, "The Senate: New Style," The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1924, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup>Alan L. Clem pointed out that there has historically been a high percentage of senators appointed to fill unexpired terms who have held no previous political positions. Clem stated that between 1913 and

party leaders had on the election of senators, it probably did force party leaders to make some adjustments in their campaign strategies. It likely encouraged them to make certain concessions to the electability of candidates from other offices within the Senate recruitment structure besides those from the state legislative offices.

And, of course, not just any political experience was sufficient to be elected to office before or after this Amendment was ratified. While the Amendment had increased the number of first offices from which senators might enter the Senate, the practice remained that experience in certain end offices was of greater advantage to the candidates than experience in other end offices. Using Schlesinger's "index of finality"<sup>1</sup> to measure the importance of particular offices as end offices within the Senate recruitment structure, Figure 14 specifies that since the ratification of the Amendment, the same important end offices before ratification--federal legislative, state elective, and administrative offices--remained the most important offices for a

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1964, 44 of 146 appointed senators had no previous political experience.

Alan L. Clem, "Political Representation and Senate Vacancies," Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (February, 1966), 68.

<sup>1</sup>The index of finality is a percentage of those senators holding a particular office who held this office as an end office in the recruitment structure. It indicates the place the office held in a senator's career and whether it has been transitional or an immediate stepping stone to the office of senator. It is computed by taking the end office/number of senators with this office as political experience. A high index indicates that the office was an important direct link to the Senate office.

Schlesinger, How They Became Governor, p. 12.




Fig. 14. --Index of Finality of those senators who first entered the Senate before 1913 compared to senators who first entered the Senate after 1913.

Note: The full office titles abbreviated in this figure may be found in Table 8. See Chapter V for a definition of the Index of Finality.

Senate candidate to achieve just prior to his campaign for the Senate. Thus candidates occupying these positions in the recruitment structure tended to have an easier time advancing directly into the Senate than candidates from other offices assuming, of course, that all other dimensions for recruitment were held constant.


Still another barrier standing in the way of easy accessibility to the Senate has been the continuation of a sluggish rate of turnover among the Senate personnel since 1913. It was expected by some supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment that a more frequent turnover rate would naturally follow the ratification of the Amendment. George H. Haynes, foremost supporter of direct election, was convinced that popular election would inevitably shorten a senator's career and make it possible for more candidates to serve in the Senate:

Again, the choice of senators by state legislatures has tended to produce a continuity of service, and hence an efficiency based upon long experience in legislative work. . . . But if the efforts of popular elections be judged by the results produced in the election of governors and of representatives in Congress, it is clear that the trading of localities, the restless craving for rotation in office, the insistence that prizes be widely distributed, would make it highly improbable that a senator would be given more than one or at the most, two terms . . . for the evidence is incontrovertible that the American people still cherish the notion of rotation in office, and that they are particularly loath to re-elect men for long terms of legislative service.<sup>1</sup>

But what has actually occurred, as diagramed in Figure 15, is that there has been a steady increase in the number of years served by the

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<sup>1</sup>George H. Haynes, The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1906), p. 268.



KEY

- ..... years covered in this analysis before 1913
- years covered in this analysis after 1913

Fig. 15. --Average years of service of all senators who have served in the Senate. (Source: Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969], p. 43.)

senator since the early Congresses.<sup>1</sup> And, as Ripley pointed out, it was during the period from 1899 to 1911 that the turnover rate first began slowing down. This was a period just prior to direct election, but it was also a period when about one-half of the states had established direct primaries that allowed for a "semi-popular" election.<sup>2</sup> This gives us some idea of what could be expected when the Amendment universalized popular election. From 1916 to 1932, after the Amendment's adoption, the general trend in the number of Senate terms per candidate steadily increased with only a slight recession occurring whenever a large number of senators failed in their bid for reelection.<sup>3</sup> And the trend of long tenure for senators has increased during the twentieth century to such a peak that V. O. Key, Jr., observed of recent elections that "only about 10 per cent of the incumbents who seek renomination in direct primaries are denied it."<sup>4</sup>

Popular election probably failed to increase turnover because of a number of factors. For one reason, an increased life expectancy among white American males of 40 years of age or more has increased

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<sup>1</sup>Ripley, Power in the Senate, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>R. Earl McClendon, "Reelection of United States Senators," The American Political Science Review, XXVIII (August, 1934), 640.

<sup>3</sup>A recession such as this occurred in 1930 and 1932 when the Republican majority was overthrown by the nationwide Democratic victory.

<sup>4</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 441.

since 1902 from 27.7 to 31.5 years as of 1956.<sup>1</sup> This increased life expectancy has allowed the incumbent senator to serve for an extended number of years, which has made it very difficult for challenging candidates to gain entrance because of the election advantages incumbents enjoy. To mention only two advantages that bias an election in favor of the incumbent, of course, are the employment of campaign personnel at public expense and the advantage of increased public exposure that comes from holding public office.<sup>2</sup>

Another reason that probably worked to keep Senate turnover low after direct election concerned the decrease in the number of voluntary Senate resignations after direct election. William Riker estimated that from 1790 to 1819 there were 89 senators who resigned from office. From 1820 to 1849 the number of senators who resigned rose to 91, while from 1850 to 1879 34 senators, exclusive of those who seceded, resigned. From 1880 to 1909 only 23 senators resigned, and from 1910 to 1939 21 senators resigned.<sup>3</sup> Better working conditions may have brought about this decrease in resignations but one cannot be sure. The pay has increased, but office staffing is still inadequate for

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<sup>1</sup> Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 386.

<sup>3</sup> William H. Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism," The American Political Science Review, XLIX (June, 1955), 462.



the senators' needs.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the exigencies of handling communications with constituents in the enlarged constituencies have become overwhelming.<sup>2</sup>

One final reason that might suggest why senators have remained in office for a greater length of time was indicated by Samuel Huntington.<sup>3</sup> He pointed out that in the twentieth century there has been an increased lack of occupational interchange among Congress, the Administration, and private organizations with fewer senators gaining access to either of these other areas of endeavor. Possibly the inability of the senator to move into a comparable position of power and authority in the Administration or private industry has increased his satisfaction with his present position in the Senate.

Whatever the specific reasons for the lack of turnover since 1913, change in the mode of election failed to do anything to stem this condition. The careers of senators have extended themselves since 1913, and this has consequently acted as one more barrier to the free accessibility of new candidates wishing to hold a seat.

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred de Grazia, ed., Congress: The First Branch of Government (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 162.

<sup>2</sup> Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania, for example, estimated that his mail totaled 110,000 letters and postcards yearly with an additional 15,000 pieces of bulk mail.

Joseph S. Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in The Congress and America's Future, ed. by David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 12.

A Concluding Remark

We can therefore see, as depicted in Figure 16, that although this Amendment opened up more channels of entrance to the recruitment structure itself through the leveling effect of the Amendment, these pathways were immediately constricted by the funneling effect created by the necessity of the candidate belonging to the party and proving his party loyalty, of the necessity of the candidate attaining a certain few end offices as compared to others, and the inability of a candidate to run for election because of the generally slower turnover rates after direct election. And so, in reality, achieving a Senate seat was as difficult after direct election as before. Senators from previously unrepresented social classes and occupations were represented in the Senate after direct election, but had these senators been unwilling to follow the restrictive conventions of recruitment they would never have achieved a Senate seat and would have remained as unsuccessful in their campaign bids to the Senate as they had been before direct election. It would thus appear that, contrary to expectations, these restrictions kept Senate accessibility substantially aloof from many an amateur politician and lover of democracy who might have thought that in a popular constituency he would have been able to succeed.




Fig. 16. -- Diagrammatic representation of the effect of direct election on the recruitment structure.

Note: The full office titles abbreviated in this figure may be found in Table 8.

## CONCLUSION

### DIRECT ELECTION--A DEMOCRATIZING REFORM?

People are constantly expecting the millennium from some political contrivance that proves afterwards disappointing, and Americans from their love of machinery are perhaps peculiarly susceptible to this feeling. One panacea of promise in its day was representative government; another was universal suffrage; a third, the checks and balances of the American constitutional system. . . . Let us not be led astray by generalizations. Each institution has its limitations and will work well only within those limits.<sup>1</sup>

Predictions of the singular effect of this Amendment, as I suggested in Chapter I, in most cases were exaggerated and overstated. The political system was not overturned nor was it vastly restructured as a result of its implementation. Neither was the political system purified by this Amendment through the eradication of the "evils of politics." And what of the democratic "transmutation" of the institution that V. O. Key, Jr., had predicted would probably occur as a result of such a change in procedure?<sup>2</sup> Even this could be questioned. It

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<sup>1</sup>A. Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (2nd ed.; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), p. 234.

<sup>2</sup>V. O. Key, Jr., had suggested that:  
"The American tradition is to destroy institutions patently oligarchical or to transmute their reality into conformity with democratic forms."  
V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 131.

appeared that, in the minds of the Progressives, the Amendment, along with the other legal reforms that had been enacted, such as the initiative, referendum, recall, direct primary, and the short ballot, were devised specifically with the intention of bringing the process of government closer to the lay voter. In the words of Woodrow Wilson:

I want the people to come in and take possession of their premises; for I hold that the government belongs to the people, and that they have a right to the intimate access to it which will determine every turn of its policy.<sup>1</sup>

But instead of clearly forcing this conjunction of voter with the governmental processes, this Amendment seemed to have had conflicting results and may well have insulated the voter even further from his government. Those in the electorate, for example, who had hoped that this Amendment would completely dissolve party organization and its influence over Senate selection saw only a partial democratization of party as a result of the Amendment. Party leaders found, for example, that in stripping the election of senators from state legislatures increased difficulties were posed for them in controlling candidate elections to this office. Forcing the candidate to independently search for his own party organization allowed diverse nonparty elements to exert increased influence over the candidate. In addition, this new-found independence of Senate candidates resulted in increasing dissension within party ranks. Thus the Seventeenth Amendment forced both party leaders and

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<sup>1</sup>Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1913), p. 77.

candidates to make necessary adjustments to one another in order to maintain a similar relationship to the one they had had previously. But these adjustments seemed to be more organizational than anything else. The strength of party influence over candidacy seemed to maintain itself despite inroads from nonparty elements. The major organizational change seemed to be a movement toward decentralization with party losing cohesive power within Congress, as Figure 3 suggested, but developing strong personalized organizations at the constituency level. This, of course, resulted in keeping the Senate as a body tied to these individual organizations without strengthening party unity within. And it also resulted in party maintaining its vise-like hold over Senate selections despite the above mentioned inroads with the Senate office being restricted to loyal party members within the constituencies--a situation resembling that which pervaded the period prior to the passage of the Amendment.

Nor did the voter seem to be brought any closer to the senator in a representative relationship after the passage of this "democratizing" Amendment. Unexpectedly, the enormous size of the popular constituency created by the Amendment posed some difficulty for the senator in maintaining contact with the rank and file voter since all communication was limited and indirect and face to face contact was rather sporadic and infrequent with the very voters who elected him. This situation proved to be no improvement over the years prior to direct

election when the senator had had a state legislature interfering with his direct contact with rank and file voters.

And the voter who aspired to office found it no easier to gain a direct pathway to the Senate office after 1913 than he had found it prior to 1913. On the one hand, popular election had opened up the way for an increased number of candidates of varied social classes and occupations heretofore unrepresented and had provided those with administrative skills an easier entrance into the Senate due to the recruitment alteration. But important end offices were still all but required for election and the sluggish rate of turnover maintained after popular election continued to give fewer candidates an opportunity to hold office than before 1913. The Amendment, therefore, seemed to have been instrumental in lengthening the term of the senator, preventing new Senate candidates from sitting as representatives.

It was probably these conflicting results that shortly gained the Amendment new enemies within Congress and the electorate.<sup>1</sup> Disillusionment with the Amendment reached its peak in 1929 when Congressman C. L. Underhill (R-Mass.) introduced legislation in the Seventy-first Congress to return the Senate to its old form of election by state legislature.<sup>2</sup> Suggested Underhill:

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<sup>1</sup>George H. Haynes, "The Senate: New Style," The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1924, p. 257.

<sup>2</sup>The joint resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary in the House on December 16, 1929, as Article XX. It

The change ought to be welcome by the Senate because of its recent troubled experience. The time now is opportune and the proposal should relieve the Senate of trouble.<sup>1</sup>

Underhill also added that such a change would create greater party responsibility and "give statesmanship and proven ability an equal chance with wealth and demagogue"<sup>2</sup>--an argument that had earlier been used by those in support of the Amendment prior to passage.

So we might ask ourselves what went wrong? Why was such a legal change which was programmed to democratize incapable of causing a clear-cut democratizing change in the status quo? Did the reformers just fail to propose the necessary correctives when they drew up the Amendment, or could we have expected anything more? The Amendment probably failed as a clear medium to democratize because insufficient thought had been given to the underlying political environment, the versatility of party to adjust to new circumstances, the normal apathy of the voting electorate and of the difficulty in attempting to combat political corruption when an office of power and authority such as the Senate is at stake. The difficulty in misunderstanding a democratic

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guaranteed that the election of senators would be carried out by state legislatures. The Amendment died in Committee.

U.S., Congress, House, A Joint Resolution proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of Senators, H.J. Res. 166, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., reprint.

<sup>1</sup>"For Old Senatorial Plan," New York Times, December 16, 1929, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.



polity and the correctives that may be taken within might be summed up in the words of William A. White:

There is danger always when man makes a thing--whether it be a king, a constitution, a city, a democracy, or what not in the way of a human institution--of his mistaking the thing for an end, when it would be merely a means of human usefulness. The real danger from democracy is that we will get drunk on it.<sup>1</sup>

What these unpredictable results from the Seventeenth Amendment seem to say is that whenever we determine that an institution should be tampered with, we should recognize that unless alterations are based on sound evidence, on past experience, and on thorough investigation, the unreformed situation may well be favorable to the unpredictable results of the reform made in ignorance. This study should serve as a caveat to politicians and voters alike who today wish to "democratize" presidential elections by modifying or abolishing altogether the Electoral College. There are still grave questions in the minds of some experts, for example, as to just what the probable results of the abolition of the Electoral College would be. Professors Irving Kristol and Paul Weaver, to name but two students of presidential reform, feel that the Electoral College has been crucial to the maintenance of a strong two-party system and that to eradicate this institution would result in severe party fragmentation:

After its fashion, the Electoral College has done much to insure that, despite the political fragmentation caused by division of powers and federalism, despite our racial and ethnic and regional heterogeneity, this nation as a whole has had but two major

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<sup>1</sup>William Allen White, The Old Order Changeth (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1912), p. 65.

permanent parties--disorganized and even inchoate, perhaps, but nevertheless two parties and not a mass of parties that intransigently reflect every fine color in the political spectrum.<sup>1</sup>

Until such predictions of the eradication of this particular institution can be successfully resolved through further study and thought, it would seem wise to follow a course of restraint as outlined by Alexander Bickel. After considering the alternative approaches to presidential election, Bickel concluded:

There are great virtues in a conservative attitude towards structural features of government. The sudden abandonment of institutions is an act that reverberates in ways no one can predict, and many come to regret. There may be a time when societies can digest radical structural change, when they are young and pliant, relatively small, containable, and readily understandable; when men can watch the scenery shift without losing their sense of direction. We are not such a society. We are well served by an attachment to institutions that are often the products more of accident than of design, or that no longer answer to their original purposes and plans, but that offer us the comfort of continuity, and challenge our resilience and inventiveness in bending old arrangements to present purposes with no outward change.<sup>2</sup>

What Bickel intimates and what I have tried to suggest in this study is not that all reform dedicated to updating our institutions should be abandoned. Such a suggestion would be shortsighted and highly misleading to the student of politics since reform is the only way that we can maintain confidence in our institutions and keep them responsive to the public will. What I do mean to suggest is that reforms made in

<sup>1</sup>Irving Kristol and Paul Weaver, "A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come," New York Times Magazine, November 23, 1969, p. 153.

<sup>2</sup>Alexander M. Bickel, The Age of Political Reform (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 3.

haste or based solely on the ideological or patriotic appeal of the moment, as was the Seventeenth Amendment, or made in ignorance of their own importance may well frustrate the whole basic purpose for which the reform was originally advanced. Changes to our institutions, particularly in the name of democracy, need thoughtful, searching study and scientific research before they are seriously advanced. And they need to be adapted in such a way that upon later review the reform may again be altered if necessary in order to bring about the desired results. It is toward the political scientist that the policy-maker should turn for this prerequisite knowledge in order to gain a proper perspective for reform. And it is toward the policy-maker that we, as political scientists, should turn for the data most vital to the political system to make our perspectives worth studying and sharing.

## APPENDIX I

### PARTISANSHIP AND ROLL CALL ANALYSIS

Roll calls selected for this analysis were taken from both sessions of the 50th, 56th, 68th, and 71st Congresses. These particular Congresses were selected because of the availability of the data and because they offered an opportunity to spot check Congresses in detail before and after 1913. All roll calls were used and were divided into the following issue categories which were selected to parallel studies made by Julius Turner<sup>1</sup> and John Bockover Johnson, Jr.,<sup>2</sup> for purposes of comparison:

1. tariff and trade
2. patronage
3. private bills
4. government action, political parties and government regulation
5. bureaucracy, general administration and civil service

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<sup>1</sup>Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951).

<sup>2</sup>John Bockover Johnson, Jr., "The Extent and Consistency of Party Voting in the United States Senate" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, March, 1943).

6. education, labor, and welfare
7. constitutional rights: including states' rights, minority rights, women's rights, and issues of reapportionment
8. general government: legislative, executive, and judicial issues
9. national security: armament and military
10. foreign policy and immigration
11. taxes and economic policy
12. District of Columbia
13. prohibition
14. agriculture

Of the above categories only seven yielded enough roll calls before and after 1913 to be used in this comparison. Those seven appear in Table 1.

## APPENDIX II

### GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS OF THE U.S.

For purposes of analysis I have divided the country into geographic sections consistent with the University of Michigan's standard ICPR state codes. These sections are defined for the reader on the accompanying map and include the following: New England, the Middle Atlantic states, the East North Central states, the West North Central states, the Southern states, the Pacific Coast states, the Border states, and the Mountain states.




Fig. 17. --Map of the United States divided by geographic regions.

## APPENDIX III

### THE METHOD OF CORRELATION

The statistical method used for this analysis consisted of correlating roll call votes on particular issues with constituency characteristics of urbanism, nativity, employment, and per capita income for the years 1890, 1910, and 1940. Correlated with this census data were the responses of 602 senators to seventy-nine domestic issue roll calls selected from the first sessions of the 49th, 54th, 59th, 69th, 74th, and the 79th Congresses. The method of correlation chosen for this analysis was the biserial correlation, which allows the researcher to positively indicate the relationship between two characteristics in a desired correlation.<sup>1</sup> Computation of the biserial correlation was accomplished with the use of the following formula:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See J. E. Wert, C. O. Neidt, and J. S. Ahmann, Statistical Methods in Educational and Psychological Research (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), pp. 256-63, for a detailed explanation of the use of the biserial correlation method.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 258-59.

The actual correlations were carried out by means of the MESA 85 computer program developed in 1965 by B. D. Wright, C. Bradford, and R. Stecker at the University of Chicago.



$$r_{\text{bis}} = \frac{d}{\sigma} \left( \frac{pq}{z} \right)$$

where:

$r_{\text{bis}}$  = biserial  $r$

$d$  = difference between the categories in means of the numerical variable.

$\sigma$  = standard deviation of numerical variable in total group being studied (not population estimate), i. e.,

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{\sum x^2}{N}}$$

$p$  = proportion of cases in one of the dichotomous categories.

$q$  = proportion of cases in the other of the dichotomous categories.



$z$  = heights of ordinate dividing the normal curve of unit area into  $p$  and  $q$  parts.

## APPENDIX IV

### THE STEP FUNCTION ANALYSIS

The method of analysis which was used to discover whether the results of the research of Senate elections were due to the Amendment change in 1913 or to other variables over time was the multiple regression analysis. The approach, set up by Duncan MacRae, Jr., attempted to determine whether a given change indicated that there was a step function or whether it was only a steady increase over time. If a step function was found in the results, it would lend more weight to the charge that the change in question was precipitated by the Amendment. I attempted to "predict" values of a dependent variable in terms of two independent variables--one of which was a linearly increasing variable (time), and the other which was a step function of time. The model used was set up as follows:

Time period:	1	2	3	4	5	6
Step function:	-1	-1	-1	+1	+1	+1
Linear function:	-5	-3	-1	+1	+3	+5



Since I only had a series involving six cases, it made the two functions, at times, hard to distinguish.

The actual equation used in the multiple regression is of the following nature:

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2$$

where Y is the dependent variable and  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are the two predictors.

The actual computation of the equation was carried out by the MESA 85 computer program developed in November, 1965 by B. D. Wright, C. Bradford, and R. Strecker at the University of Chicago.

In the interpretation of the results, the findings that the researcher would look for first, in this case, would be both the metric B value, the F value, and how often the actual points of association fall along the lines drawn through the predictive points of association.

APPENDIX V

THE STEP FUNCTION ANALYSIS AND  
POLITICAL OFFICE EXPERIENCE

TABLE 13  
SENATORS WHO HAD STATE LEGISLATIVE  
EXPERIENCE AS MEASURED BY A  
STEP FUNCTION ANALYSIS

Congress	Observed percentages of senators who had legislative experience	Predicted percentages of senators who would have had legislative experience
49th	63%	62%
54th	60	58
59th	50	53
69th	42	42
74th	33	38
79th	38	33

Notes:

For Congresses before 1913, N=272

For Congresses after 1913, N=299

slope = 3.55, step function = .89;  $F_{05}(1, 3) = 10.13$

TABLE 14

SENATORS WHO HAD FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE  
EXPERIENCE AS MEASURED BY A  
STEP FUNCTION ANALYSIS

Congress	Observed percentages of senators who had federal legislative experience	Predicted percentages of senators who would have had federal legislative experience
49th	43%	41%
54th	36	40
59th	42	40
69th	28	27
74th	26	27
79th	26	26

## Notes:

For Congresses before 1913, N=277

For Congresses after 1913, N=299

slope = .23; step function = 4.6;  $F_{05}(1, 3) = 10.13$

APPENDIX VI

VOTE COMPARISONS ON NEW DEAL TYPE ISSUES

TABLE 15

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS ON VOTES TABULATED ON  
NEW DEAL TYPE ISSUES BEFORE AND AFTER 1913  
AND URBAN CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS

Congress	Votes on New Deal type roll calls from senators selected		(N) Issues
	BEFORE 1913	AFTER 1913	
49th	.200	. .	2
59th	.013	. .	1
64th	. .	.252	5
69th	. .	.240	6
74th	. .	.214	11
79th	. .	.117	4
Average Correlations	.137	.212	Total N = 29

Notes:

Issues selected for this comparison involved primarily government regulation and expansion issues.

Census data came from the U. S. Census figures for the years of 1890, 1910, and 1940 and included data on all states during these years.

APPENDIX VII

SIZE OF THE BIRTHPLACES  
OF SENATORS




Fig. 18. --The size of birthplaces of senators who were selected by state legislatures and the popular vote before and after 1913.

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